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Abstract:
This thesis seeks to design and evaluate a digital forensics challenge for inclusion in a 
multinational cyber defense exercise. The intent is to narrow down the key skills a state-based
organization requires of its digital forensics experts and design and integrate technical tasks 
that adequately test these skills into a larger cyber defense exercise. It uses the NATO Locked
Shields cyber defense exercise as a test case, for which the thesis author joined the digital 
forensics design team at the NATO Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in designing and 
implementing a three day digital forensics challenge. This thesis establishes a series of 
technical and procedural skills state-based organizations require of their experts, determines 
ways to test these skills, and develops a scenario-based digital forensics challenge.  Using 
first hand observations, participant feedback, and challenge scores to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the challenge, it finds that the scenario adequately tested a majority of the 
skills at the appropriate difficulty level and needs improvement in timing and reporting 
standards. Finally, it explores ways to improve upon the selected methods and tasks for future
exercises. 
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Digitaalse ekspertiisi ülesannete disain rahvusvaheliste küberõppuste 
kontekstis  
Lühikokkuvõte:
Töös  kujundatakse  ja  hinnatakse  digitaalse  ekspertiisi  teemalist  ülesannet,  mida
kasutada rahvusvahelisel küberkaitse õppusel. Eesmärk on keskenduda põhioskustele, mida
üks  riiklik organisatsioon  oma  digitaalse  ekspertiisi  ekspertidelt  vajab  ja  disainida
ning integreerida tehnilisi  ülesandeid,  mis adekvaatselt  testivad neid oskusi  suuremahulise
küberkaitseõppuse raames. See töö kasutab Locked Shields küberkaitseõppust näitena, mille
jaoks väitekirja  autor  liitus  digitaalse  ekspertiisi  arendusmeeskonnaga  NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence juures, kui nad kavandasid ja rakendasid kolm päeva
kestvat  digitaalse ekspertiisi  ülesannet.  See  lõputöö  identifitseerib  rea  tehnilisi  ja
protseduurilisi  oskuseid,  mida riiklikud organisatsioonid vajavad oma ekspertidelt,  määrab
viisid,  kuidas testida neid oskusi ja arendab välja stsenaariumipõhise digitaalse ekspertiisi
ülesande. Kasutades õppusel vahetult saadud tähelepanekuid, osalejate tagasisidet ja ülesande
tulemusi, leitakse  lõputöös,  et  loodud  ülesanne  testis  osalejate  oskusi  õigel
raskustasemel ja vajab  parendamist  ajastuses  ning  aruandluse  standardites.  Lõpetuseks
uuritakse erinevaid viise, kuidas parendada valitud meetodeid ja ülesandeid tulevaste õppuste
tarbeks.
Võtmesõnad: 
Digitaalne kohtuekspertiis, NATO, küberülesanne, pahavara, kohtuekspertiisi süsteem, võrgu
kriminalistika, kohtumeditsiini aruanded
CERCS:P170,arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine (automaatjuhtimisteooria)
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1. Introduction
Cyber security exercises are a cornerstone of an organization's ability to gauge and increase
its level of preparedness and technical expertise for countering cyber espionage, theft, and
attacks. These exercises include a broad range of areas to test, including: network penetration,
file security, public affairs, legal considerations, and data protection. An area of testing that is
relatively  new  to  these  exercises  is  digital  forensics,  the  process  of  investigating  cyber
incidents. For States this area is extremely important, because the ability to attribute cyber
incidents and recover data can mean the difference between war and peace.  While States
conduct their own internal exercises, cyberspace is an international domain, and this makes
multinational exercises extremely important. For these exercises, it is vital that the challenges
test  the  main  goals  of  all  of  the  involved parties,  both  efficiently  and effectively.  These
exercises are comprehensive and take a long time to plan; each testing area is nested within
the larger exercise scenario. Hence, the digital forensics challenge needs make sense within
the context of the overall exercise story, fit within a few days of game-play, and accurately
test the main skills the States require of its experts. 
The main question that this  thesis  asks is: how can organizations design and implement an
effective and efficient digital forensics challenge for a multi-state cyber exercise? This is a
complex question, because it requires a series of considerations. First an organization needs
to  consider  the  elements  of  a  cyber  exercise  and  what  are  its  constraints.  Second,  the
organization needs to decide what are the most important digital forensics skills to test. Third,
the organization has to design a realistic challenge that tests those skills within the context of
a larger cyber exercise. Finally, it needs to develop a way of evaluating its design. This last
part requires a test case. This thesis uses the NATO Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence's
annual Locked Shields cyber exercise. Locked Shields is a good test case, because the digital
forensics  team could compare  its  results  with the results  and experiences  from the 2015
digital  forensics  challenge.  The  exercise  is  multinational,  comprehensive,  and  limited  in
duration. The digital forensics team used the performance and feedback from the exercise
designers and participants to judge how well the challenge efficiently and effectively tested
the digital forensics skills and if those skills were, indeed, the most import to test. 
This thesis author worked with a group of three technical experts at the NATO Cyber Defense
Centre  of  Excellence  in  designing,  implementing,  and  evaluating  the  digital  forensics
challenge for the 2016 Locked Shields cyber exercise over the course of seven months. This
thesis resulted in a three day digital forensics challenge that included hard disk image and
memory  dump  acquisition,  network  and  memory  analysis,  file  carving,  and  forensics
reporting tasks. It found that the Locked Shields 2016 design tested nearly all of the most
important forensics skills to test with room for development on preparation of the teams, use
of anti-forensics, and reporting design. Comparison of results from Locked Shields 2015 to
Locked Shields 2016 showed a vast improvement in the design and implementation of the
digital forensics challenge in terms of difficulty and timing. 
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2. Background
In  this  first  section,  the  thesis  author  reviews  various  types  of  existing  cyber  defense
exercises and the digital forensics portions they include. She then researched and determined
the main goals and limitation of State cyber defense exercises. 
2.1 State of the Art
Types of Exercises
While the type of exercise on which this thesis is focused is an inter-team competition, many
other  varieties  of  cyber  exercises  exist  for  which  digital  forensics  challenges  are  also
required. These exercises go from focusing on individual persons to hundreds of participants.
The most basic type of exercise is skills improvement, in which a single person or small
group  of  people  must  perform the  exercise  in  order  to  increase  a  specific  skill  set.  For
example, a forensic analyst may be required to recover all photographs from a corrupted New
Technology File System (NTFS) in order to improve his file carving abilities. 
Slightly larger groups can participate in Capture the Flag or Workshop exercises, in which a
series of challenges are constructed and a team must retrieve some sort of value or token to
prove that they successfully completed each task. In such an exercise, a digital forensics team
may need to locate the login credentials of a user who downloaded a corrupted file and also
recover the file itself.  They also may need to submit the credentials  and file hash as the
“flags” to the event organizers or just discuss the solutions if in a Workshop forum [1]. 
At the strategic level, Table Top exercises test the plans and procedures of an organization or
a  group  of  organizations  (known  as  Distributed  Table  Top  exercises).  In  these  types  of
exercises, management level individuals discuss how they would respond in given situations
according to established routines and procedures [1]. For instance, a government agency may
conduct an exercise to test the authorities it has in responding to a ransomeware incident. No
technical  solution  will  actually  be  implemented,  and  policies  and  procedures  are  more
important to the discussion than the technical responses. In a similar vein, Command Post and
Building Block exercises  occur  at  the policy and procure level  as well  but are  primarily
focused on inter-organization and inter-body coordination.  These exercises often occur in
phases. Each level of the exercise is started and completed and passed up to the next resolve
to resolve their  layer of the issue [1].  These exercises are  common amongst government
agencies  in  which  response  to  a  cyber  incident  involves  several  bodies  with  different
organizational policies and authorities. 
Additionally, on a more defensive side, there are general training and awareness exercises
that organizations give to their users and clients. These can range from employee phishing
awareness training to security policy testing. These types of exercises may be relevant to
digital  forensics  in  terms of teaching people what  information they provide (to  websites,
servers, ect) is easily recoverable by a malicious actor and how to mitigate against it. 
Existing Multi-Actor Cyber Defense Competitions
In recent years digital  forensics challenges have been added to several well-known cyber
defense  competitions.  One  such  competition  is  the  Cyber  Olympics,  a  series  of  cyber
competitions  amongst  high  school  and  college  level  students  in  the  United  States.  The
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Cybersecurity Challenge (part of the Olympics open only to players over the age of eighteen)
is a hybrid Capture the Flag, competition exercise. The first phase of the challenge is a digital
forensics challenge.  This phase lasts  four hours and requires teams to locate  evidence of
intrusion and analyze one or more of the following: malware files,  memory dumps, hard
drives, logs, and network traffic. Teams are scored according to the number of artifacts they
find [2].  Note,  in  this  exercise all  teams are given the items to analyze,  so there are  no
acquisition tasks.
 
One exercise well-designed for the inclusion of digital forensics injects is the United States
National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC), which presents competitors with
an already constructed network and services that they must defend. The exercise claims to
focus on the “more operational task of assuming administrative and protective duties” [3].
Teams are required to respond to outside threats,  determine which services are vital,  and
maintain or remove services as they see fit. This is a good set up for testing procedural and
policy  level  considerations  in  concert  with  the  technical  capabilities  of  the  competitors.
Teams are scored according to automated assessments of their services as determined by the
services' value by the competition coordinators [3].
Similarly, Cyber Panoply is an exercise that provides each team with a network; however, this
competition is a zero-sum game. Teams compete over common resources and services. The
competition requires teams to perform both defensive and offensive actions, protecting the
resources and services they have under their control and penetrating the network of rival
teams in order to gain new ones. As in NCCDC, teams are scored according to automated
service scanners [4]. The forensics piece of the challenge (finding intrusions and the sources
of those intrusions) is scored indirectly in this way. 
One of the most advanced cyber defense competitions in terms of digital forensics scenarios
is the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Security Service (CSS) Cyber Defense
Exercise, referred to as NSA/CSS CDX. This exercise pits the students at the United States
service academies against one another as Blue Teams (defending teams). The Red Team (the
attacking  team)  is  composed  of  approximately  forty  experts  from the  NSA and military
reserve components. The competition requires each team to configure and defend a network
with  specified  services.  In  2010  the  competition  introduced  its  first  digital  forensics
challenge. A gray cell of system users simulates issues in the network created by average
users, one of whom is operating from a suspicious computer system on which team had to
conduct forensics analysis [5]. Teams receive points for maintaining services and detecting
and responding to threats [6]. 
The exercise that this thesis will use as a test case is the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) Locked Shields exercise. This annual event has reached a
size of twenty teams of NATO member and ally military and government organizations. The
CCDCOE first ran the exercise in 2010 and it now includes technical, forensic, policy, legal,
and media level challenges [7]. The CCDCOE introduced the first digital forensics challenge
in the 2014 competition and widely expanded on in  the 2015 competition.  For the 2015
digital forensics challenge teams were given a PCAP file of network traffic and access to a
live virtual machine for analysis [8]. The challenge required teams to analyze a compromised
machine and compose a digital forensics report, including acquiring an image of the virtual
machine  [9].  The  coordinators  scored  the  teams  based  upon  the  forensics  reports  they
submitted, to include how and what they found in their analysis. They also provided a simple
template for the players to use in completion of their reports [8]. 
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2.2 Considerations
Actors Involved in a Cyber Incident
Prior to developing any specific scenario for a cyber exercise it is important to understand the
actors who may be involved. There are a wide variety of actors who would be responsible for
responding to a cyber incident, including: technical, legal, managerial, and political. These
actors play their parts at different points in the incident response cycle, which consists of five
phases: [10]
1. Prevent and Protect
2. Detect
3. Analyze
4. Respond
5. Resolve
Starting with the first phase, Chief Information Officers (CIO) and Cyber Security Officers
(CSO)  are  primarily  responsible  for  conducting  risk  assessments  and  approving  a  cyber
security  policy  for  an  organization.  These  key  documents  identify  the  possible  threats,
vulnerabilities, and impacts of potential incidents and how to mitigate the risks. To craft these
documents, the officers analyze the organization's services, IT assets, client base, network
and physical infrastructure, and priorities of upper level management. They need to “think
like a hacker” [11]. Specific personnel are assigned to fix or manage these risks depending on
the organization's resources and risk tolerance. It then becomes the responsibility of these
people to detect a threat if an incident occurs. This would usually be the responsibility of
system and network administrators. 
These administrators have to quickly take action to isolate the threat and communicate with
the CIO and/or CSO about the steps they should take. This involves using memory and PCAP
files and system, network, and firewall logs. Essentially, they must detect the precise location
and actions of the threat. Once they pass the information up the proper Chain of Command
(CoC),  the  analysis  phase  begins.  In  this  phase a  variety of  actors  determine  what  steps
should be taken in order to respond to the incident. Business and branch managers consider
what human resources are necessary and available to resolve the incident according to the
organization's  Internal  Role  plan  [12].  This  includes  primarily  staffing  and  budget
information,  particularly if  there exists  a need to outsource.  At the same time,  the board
members and executives (or political leaders if it is a government agency) need to consider
the impact to the bottom line and mission of the organization, as compared to the costs of
solving the issue. To do this they require an impact analysis and real-time updates on any
media coverage of the incident. 
There  are  a  variety  of  actors  involved  in  incident  response.  The  system  and  network
administrators and any special technical personal are responsible for implementing whatever
patches or technical fixes have been deemed appropriate. Board members, politicians, and
public relations officials must handle communications with media concerning the incident
and how it is being resolved. Communication with media should first occur no later than
thirty minutes post incident detection. The CIO and/or CSO must communicate with system
and network users concerning what actions they can and cannot perform during response to
7
the incident. It is sometimes also necessary to communicate with specific users whose actions
facilitated the incident. 
The resolution phase of the incident involves more than just paperwork. It is here that legal
and law enforcement entities may become involved. The entities need access to forensics
reports, evidence they want to image and/or analyze, software and hardware documentation,
system and network logs, and user information. CSO and/or CIO need to communicate with
users to prevent a future occurrence, often involving the creation and deployment of user
training.  Board members,  political  entities,  and public relations  officials  must  handle any
additional media fall out, largely oriented around conveying to the media what plans are in
place to prevent a future incident. Finally, investors and constituencies need to be informed of
the final impact and what is being done to prevent a future incident [12]. 
Exercise Goals
Digital Forensics experts are expected to possess a broad range of technical capabilities. The
discipline of digital forensics includes the acquisition, processing, analysis, and reporting of
digital artifacts and evidence. Two well known certification authorities for digital forensics
experts  are  the  SANS  Institute,  which  administers  the  Global  Information  Assurance
Certificate  [13],  and  the  International  Society  of  Forensic  Computer  Examiners,  which
administers  the  Certified  Computer  Examiner  (CCE)  Certificate  [14].  The  CCE  is  a
prestigious non-vendor specific forensic certification, used in over twenty-eight countries to
validate individuals' forensic competencies. These two certificate programs are designed to
test the “core skills required to collect and analyze data [13].” They will be used to establish
the professional competencies of digital forensics experts.
 
To begin with, forensics experts need to perform various acquisition methods. These include
physical and remote acquisition. The devices from which forensic images can be acquired
include external and internal hard drives, removable media such as Universal Serial Buses
(USB),  mobile  devices,  and  network  storage  devices  (such  as  share  folders  and  cloud
storage).  In recent years, memory acquisition has also become more important, due to the
“growing importance of  temporary files” [15].  This  type  of  acquisition is  also extremely
important in situations where powering off the device would result in data loss [15]. Apart
from forensic images, digital forensic experts should also be capable of acquiring network
traffic [14]. Every time a forensics expert performs a procedure on digital artifacts, they risk
corrupting the evidence, and for this reason digital forensic experts must be able to verify the
integrity  of  their  acquisitions.  Methods  to  do  this  include  metadata  reading  and hashing
algorithms. Experts must also be capable of demonstrating the reliability of the tools/methods
used to acquire the images/traffic through proper procedures, such as safe boot [14]. 
Once finished acquiring images and traffic, forensic examiners must also obtain additional
artifacts valuable to the investigation. These are the files and metadata attributes themselves.
Forensic experts need to read file systems for multiple operating systems and perform data
carving to obtain files from memory, both allocated and unallocated [14]. In order to properly
carve data, forensics experts need to demonstrate the abilities to read and analyze the Master
Boot  Record (MBR) [13] and other  file  system indexes and registries using hexadecimal
values. This means they must also be capable of the proper installation and use of digital
forensic software. In some instances, forensic experts may not be certain which files contain
the information they need to obtain. Experts can use strings analysis to search for key terms
within a series of directories for specific information, such as “password” [13]. 
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In addition to data recovery, digital forensic experts need to analyze data for the evidence it
represents. Through system and network log analysis, forensic experts can demonstrate when
and how certain software entered and affected computer systems and networks. This concerns
the fundamental issue of attribution. An example would be a forensics expert using network
traffic to trace the domain of origin of a Trojan or other form of malware. Another important
aspect of attribution includes Prefetch Analysis, which concerns executable file metadata and
logging.  Digital  forensics  experts  should also be capable  of  tracking user  activity within
networks and systems for the purposes of evaluating user account abnormalities or events
[13]. This can be useful, for example, to show what user account an attacker compromised
and used to access confidential information. It is also useful for determining the source of that
compromise, such as users who use the same passwords for multiple credentials. Browser
forensics  is  also  crucial  to  attribution  and  the  patching  of  vulnerabilities  and  is  another
valuable digital forensic skill [13]. For instance, an expert can determine what site a user last
visited before a system crash through accessing the history.dat file that Firefox automatically
writes [16]. The biggest issue with attribution, however, is that forensic data is only as good
as the trust in which others place in its integrity. 
Digital Forensics experts not only need to be able to obtain and analyze data but also present
it  as pertinent,  complete,  valid,  and legal.  The European Union Agency for Network and
Information  Security  (ENISA)  is  the  center  of  expertise  in  information  security  for  the
European Union, both its member states and citizens [17]. A Cyber Emergency Response
Team  (CERT)  from  ENISA composed  a  comprehensive  digital  forensics  handbook  that
establishes some basic guidelines for the proper handling of evidence during the collection
and analysis  phases  of  a  digital  forensics  examination.  If  the  artifacts  the  expert  will  be
acquiring and/or analyzing will be used as evidence at any point, then it is vital that the expert
follows proper procedures. This means that the analyst obtains the data in compliance with
applicable law, is qualified to perform the actions he/she performs, and is capable of proving
the  data's  authenticity  and  veracity  [17].  This  proof  comes  from  an  important  set  of
documents the examiner must be able to produce: the report.
In short, the examination itself should be traceable and repeatable by a third party [14], and
thus the purpose of proper documentation of the investigation. One method for achieving this
is to use built-in forensic software logging tools and exporting data items to comma-separated
(CSV) and text files [18]. This documentation needs to include four key components: case
summary, acquisition steps, analysis processes, and conclusions. The examiner must be able
to, in simple terms, describe the context and importance of the case to which the examination
is relevant. The key here is simplistic. A forensics expert must be able to convey to a non-
expert  what  and  how all  steps  in  the  investigation  occurred.  If  necessary the  report  can
include a glossary in order to support this goal [18]. Next, the expert must include all actions
taken on data objects, including the methods used to preserve the integrity of data and verify
their acquisition. In describing the findings of the investigation, the expert must to describe
the tools used such that a third party could repeat the experiments exactly. Finally, they need
to convincingly summarize the conclusions of the investigation. 
In  the  construction  of  this  report,  a  digital  forensics  expert  needs  to  include  a  few very
important aspects, often referred to as audit data. Evidence is only as good as it is presented.
An  examiner  must  preserve  the  audit  data  and  logs  during  the  investigation  for  use  as
appendices in the report [19]. During an examination more than one person will likely access
the  evidence  items,  and  for  this  reason  an  expert  must  properly  document  the  chain  of
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custody and purpose of access. The forensics expert has to construct a proper time-line of
data transport, storage, and analysis to include persons, places, precautions, and actions [19].
This means the expert must understand what qualifies a person to access different types of
data (i.e. certified individual having access to network firewalls). All tools used during the
investigation need to be verifiable not only as a tool but within the investigation itself. This
means the expert  must  be able  to perform and document the calibration of tools  for the
purposes of the investigation [19]. Finally, in the event that improper procedures or hasty
measures are taken, the expert should be capable of explaining within the report why. Such
explanations are key to supporting the forensic evidence as pertinent and valid.
Having  established  what  technical  and  procedural  capabilities  forensics  experts  should
possess, a challenge design team must also consider what are broader than the aims of state
governments.  In  state-based  exercises,  the  goals  of  the  government  drive  the  skills  the
exercise should test.  State based exercises are unique in that they must prioritize actions
against a broader set of goals and take a “full spectrum approach” [20]. They must test a
variety of capabilities and functions of personnel and constructs. In 2001 the United States
designed the inter-military academy cyber defense exercise previously discussed, NSA/CSS
CDX, in which participants had to “design, implement, manage, and defend a network of
computers” [21].  Since  then this  annual  exercise  has  grown to test  the broader  range of
aspects, because state-based exercises need to examine “legal, ethical, forensic, and technical
components while emphasizing a team approach” [21]. The team-based aspect is significant
here. Digital forensics experts must operate within a team in the exercise, and sometimes may
even be responsible for activities beyond forensics due to personnel constraints. Thus, testing
a  unit's  communication  channels  and  efficiency  is  almost  more  important  than  testing
technical skills [21]. 
State-based exercises include a wide variety of participants, not just technical experts, and
thus  the  input  of  those participants  significantly affects  the  activities  of  digital  forensics
experts. Exercises need to consider the priorities and directives of government policy bodies
[21], which may change during a dynamic exercise. For this reason, it is imperative that these
exercises “test participants readiness when faced with a realistic cyber event in a stressed
environment  against  a  dynamic  and skilled adversary”  [22].  This  means digital  forensics
experts must be forced to react to ongoing challenges, not just the static analysis of an image.
It also means prioritizing. Policy bodies will direct what forensics experts should deem most
important.  In  particular,  for  state-based  organizations  the  protection  of  confidential
information  is  often  most  important  [21].  They must  also  maintain  certain  key services,
including Domain  Name Service  (DNS),  Windows Active  Directory,  web,  chat  channels,
email, and Voice Over IP (VoIP) [23]. A unique aspect of state-based exercises is that they
need to test how to respond to untrained users, because the majority of government personnel
are non-technical and the organization's biggest liability [23]. In Locked Shields, there are
designated White Team (scenario team) players for these roles. Additionally, States have a
vested interest in appearing to be legal players. This means that digital forensics experts may
need to prove the innocence or  guilt  of  a  party,  which makes proper  documentation and
reporting even more significant [21].  Such legal constraints begin to address some of the
many constraints on exercise goals. 
Cyber exercises also have many constraints. The most obvious one is the time-issue. While
exercises that last months do exist, they are rarely used paradigms for state-based exercises
because of all of the key players involved. These players often include key policy makers and
powerful military personnel that can only devote a few days to the exercise. This means that
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all of the digital forensics injects need to be solvable in a limited amount of time, regardless
of whether the challenge includes dynamic or static analysis. This severely limits testing in
terms of acquisition. Large cyber defense exercises include multiple teams, meaning there is a
need to establish tasks that present equality of challenge [18]. This will include bandwidth
and tools. For most cases, this means the challenges should test experts' abilities to obtain and
use open source tools. 
State-based exercises apply even more constraints, particularly that the infrastructure with
which  participants  are  presented  cannot  be  significantly  altered.  It  needs  to  realistically
represent what platforms and resources the state currently possesses. For most States this
limits the operating systems to Windows, as Microsoft is the biggest government contractor
for  computer  systems  [21].  Additionally,  because  of  the  sensitive  nature  of  State  cyber
infrastructure, the game environment must be isolated, making virtualization a must. This
isolation is due to the negative consequences governments face if their activities adversely
affect  the  private  sphere,  particularly  in  democratic  States.  This  means  that  the  digital
forensics  injects  should  also  test  experts'  abilities  to  deploy,  use,  and  analyze  virtual
technologies.  State  cyber  organizations  possess  certain  recruitment  constraints.  Hiring
practices are rigid, and training is relatively fixed, as well. This means out-sourcing is usually
not an option, so exercises should reflect this. In essence, the exercise needs to test the cyber
teams' abilities to do more with less people [21]. A summary of the main skills to test is
shown in Table 1. 
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Type Skill
Technical NTFS/MBR analysis
Technical Image acquisition from hard disk
Technical Installation/use of open source tools
Technical Carving some deleted file
Technical Memory dump analysis
Technical PCAP/Netflow analysis
Technical Windows systems logs reading
Technical Use Windows Systems Admin tools
Technical Windows prefetch analysis
Technical Locate/identify malware
Technical File hashing 
Technical Tool calibration
Procedural Use case logging tools
Procedural Timelining
Procedural Description of activities
Procedural Presentation of data in visible, simplistic terms
Procedural Use and document data preservation methods
Other prioritization
Other In-time communication to team
Table 1: Goals for a Digital Forensics Challenge in a State Cyber Exercise
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    3. Design
In  this  second  section,  the  thesis  author  worked  with  a  team  of  three  other  computer
technicians at the NATO Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to determine what specific
tasks would test the skills from Fig. 1 and how to evaluate teams for completing them. The
author  supported  the  team  in  research,  technical  design  and  implementation  of  the
competition tasks and environment, including script coding and user history data creation,
and the drafting of forensic report templates and examples.
3.1 Design Methodology
Reporting
Following the technical forensics investigation,  teams must submit a forensics report  that
fulfills the procedural goals listed in Table 1. It needs to be both concise and detailed. The US
National Forensics Computer Institute (NCFI) researched and published a guide for forensics
students that is intended to describe how students should draft forensics reports for academic
exercises as part of its Network Intrusion Responder Program. The Institute's methodology
highlights one key fact: the report needs to be a one-go read [22]. This means that the report
needs to include only the most relevant details, presented in such a way that a non-expert can
read and understand the investigation in  a  few minutes.  In order  to do this,  the Institute
demands that students include a clear timeline of events, all individuals associated with the
investigation  (chain  of  custody,  device  owners  and  operators,  resources),  all  the  items
analyzed (physical and logical) and all the programs used to conduct the analysis. It suggests
that students organize the analysis in whichever way makes the most coherent story, such as
time, relationship, or device [22]. In other words, the method of dividing up the report is not
set in stone: it may vary depending on the scenario for which the report is written.
The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Ireland, and Wales (ACPO) conducted
similar research and published a best practice guide for forensics reporting. This guide is used
by the majority of forensics training programs in these countries. It discusses the initial report
specifically, advising that is should be brief and, if possible, include screen shots [23]. One of
the main points the guide emphasizes is that a report should clearly separate opinion from
fact.
Melia  Kelley,  a  senior  computer  forensics  consultant  for  First  Advantage  Litigation
Consulting, conducted a report on the most effective way to organize forensics reports. Her
main finding is that there needs be a template, because “templates are easy to create and will
end  up  saving  you  many hours  of  work”  [24].  In  a  time-pressed  situation  like  a  cyber
exercise, these hours saved are priceless. For organizations-- or exercises-- that involve actors
of many different backgrounds, templates enable standardized formatting and language that
those  responsible  for  reading and assessing  the  reports  can  easily comprehend [24].  She
suggests  that  the  templates  include  a  summary,  objective,  evidence  analyzed,  steps
performed, and findings sections. If they are of a sizable length, they should also include a
title page and table of contents [24]. 
In the Locked Shields 2015 exercise, teams were not given a typical forensics report template
or requirement. Instead, the digital forensics team asked them to submit a preliminary and
final  report.  The  preliminary  report  consisted  of  a  series  of  questions  concerning  the
investigation, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and file locations, and given a very
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simple template consisting of a two-column table in which to input their answers [25]. The
final report asked teams to answer the who, what, when, and how of the investigation using a
two-column template of time and description columns (essentially a timeline chart) [9]. The
result of using these templates was that multiple competing teams provided terse answers to
the challenge with little description [21]. Thus, the 2016 digital forensics team decided that a
more  robust  report  was  needed  for  future  exercises,  such  as  those  discussed  in  the
methodologies above.
Forensics  challenges  for  a  state-based government  exercises  involve  actors  from various
backgrounds, are pressed for time, and are nested within a larger scenario. As such, it makes
sense to adopt the template principle for the teams to fill out, with specific guidance on what
the teams need to provide. Instead of using two charts, the information obtained in both can
be consolidated into a more professional forensics template. This template should be heading-
based so that it is uniformly organized. Such a template pushes analysts to provide a coherent
story. In this venture, the timeline is also one of the most important aspects of the report, as
noted by all the methodologies listed above. Because a government forensics scenario will
contain only a few artifacts that all teams can access, the report template does not require a
title page and table of contents, particularly because this report should be fashioned more
after the initial report than a polished report going to trial. 
While the report should be concise, there are a few details teams absolutely need to include in
the  report  in  the  section  for  findings.  The  United  States  Department  of  Justice  (USJ)
published a report to guide law enforcement in forensics practices and reporting. The report
asserts that the details that should be included in regard to reproducibility of the findings are
specific  searches  performed,  such  as  string  searches,  details  related  to  ownership,  and
snapshots. In terms of verifying those findings, it is important that teams submit hash values
of all the items on which analyses were performed and specific versions for utilized hardware
and software [26]. 
Environment
The  United  States  military  conducted  a  research  project  into  the  development  of  the
NSA/CSS CDX previously discussed, which was purposed towards training and testing the
students  of  the  country's  military  academies  when  developing  the  environment  for  the
exercise. COL David Ragsdale (Ret.) was largely responsible for this study. One of the most
important aspects of the environment for a successful exercise, he found, was the need for it
to  be  isolated  during  gameplay [21].  The reason for  this  is  that  if  the  exercise  network
touches  real  world  networks,  players  need  to  be  extra  cautious  about  their  actions.
Additionally, if anything goes wrong during the exercise and negative effects are exacted on
third parties, it will bring bad press to the exercise and harm future exercise attempts [21].
Still, players need access to the internet in order to set up their machines for competition.
This is why a Day 0 is necessary. Teams need a day of access to the internet in order to set up
their  networks  and  obtain  any  resources  they  will  need  to  successfully  accomplish  the
exercise [21]. This is extremely important in terms of the kind of resources the teams should
be utilizing: open source. Requiring teams to use open source resources levels the playing
field, due to the disparity on nation's defense budgets and access to specific software [21]. 
In  terms  of  the  network  environment  itself,  it  is  realistic  and very  beneficial  to  include
systems of various operating system types.  In this  way,  the exercise can test  the players'
abilities on multiple platforms [32]. Multiple operating systems also enables exercise set-up,
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as unpatched versions are easy ways to introduce vulnerabilities into the teams' networks for
the purposes of the exercise [21]. These patches can serve as the low hanging fruit of the
exercise. In essence, the exercise needs to have multiple levels of challenge in order to keep
all  teams  motivated  to  continue  [21].  Unpatched  operating  systems  are  easy  to  fix
vulnerabilities for teams with less technical proficiency. 
For a government cyber defense exercise, and particularly for digital forensics exercises, the
scenario  that  supports  the  exercise  is  extremely  important.  Vital  skills  to  test  include
prioritization, communication, and procedures, all of which relate to the story of the exercise.
The  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  composed  a  report  for  introducing
forensics into incident response. It explained the most important questions that an effective
scenario needs to answer: [26]
1. How does the scenario dictate the sources of data?
2. How does the scenario dictate the most likely available resources and tools?
3. How does the scenario create, maintain, and require communication channels?
4. How does the scenario restrict and manage incident and response times?
5. How does the scenario shape the physical and logical environment?
The 2015 Locked Shields exercise included many elements of these methodologies. In this
exercise, the teams had a preparatory day in order to download any open source resources
they would need to their virtual network environment; however, the teams could not use this
day for any parts of the forensics challenge, including digital forensics acquisition [27]. At
the end of Day 0 the teams were disconnected from the game network(gamenet) such that
they could make no further adjustments until the start of Day 1. The network itself included
Windows 7 and 8 and multiple Linux operating systems dispersed among various subnets
[28]. The teams were all given network diagrams at the start of the exercise. This is in line
with the methodology developed for NSA/CSS CDX [21]. Fig. 1 shows the forensics related
subnets for this thesis' test case, Locked Shields 2016.
There is also the question of how much knowledge the Red Team will have of the Blue Team
and the gamenet environment. Exercises in which the attackers start from ground zero and
have to conduct the full reconnaissance phase are classified as “black box exercises” [29].
For a large scale state-based exercise, this is not very feasible. Red Teams have a short span
of time to compromise and attack multiple teams, which means the reconnaissance phase
would be too time consuming [30]. If the exercise is limited in number of Blue Teams, then it
would be possible to bring in this more realistic aspect. 
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Figure 1: Locked Shields 2016 Forensics Subnets [28]
Technical Components
A  digital  forensics  challenge  for  a  state-based  cyber  exercise  needs  to  have  several
components  in  order  to  achieve  all  the  goals  outlined  in  Table  1.  The  United  States
Department of Justice (DoJ) report suggests a number of possible challenge scenarios for
digital  forensics exercises. These include Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,  rogue wireless
access point attacks, mistaken identity attacks, uploading unwanted images, phishing scams,
and encryption attacks [26]. For these to be implemented, the digital forensics team needs to
create a number of components. A home server would be necessary for a DoS attack, as well
as some method of creating botnets. A rogue wireless access point requires an internet access
point. To upload an unwanted image they need the image itself, as well as the website or
server  to  which  it  is  being  uploaded.  Phishing  scams  require  the  creation  of  an  email
account-- and email support, in general. Encryption attacks require the files to be encrypted
and an encryption algorithm [26]. 
Then there are the items on which the participants need to perform analysis. These can be
derived from the tools that the exercise wants to require the participants to use. According to
the goals articulated in Table 1, this should include pcap files for network analysis, access to
a computer system that will allow for memory dumps and file system analysis, and web sites.
In Locked Shields 2015, teams were given virtual access to the target virtual machine (VM),
a pcap file of network traffic, a memory dump file, and the malware file that caused the
incident [8]. This means that a more robust method would include some sort of web page, as
well as more than one machine to analyze in order to require teams to deal with more than
one type of file system. 
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Scoring
The NSA/CSS CDX methodology suggests using a well-defined, uniform method of scoring,
one that scales well to teams of different sizes and skill levels, for state-based exercises [31].
This method should include both automated and manual scoring for different parts of the
exercise.  Automated  scoring  should  be  implemented  for  maintenance  of  services,  which
periodically checks the teams' vital services, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
and web servers. Penalties for down services should be cumulative over time, such that teams
lose more points the longer the services are down [31]. Teams should also be penalized for
breaking predetermined rules of conduct, such as those that mimic legal limitations [31].
The NCCDC is intended to provide curricula with a “competitive environment to assess their
student's  depth of  understanding  and operational  competency in  managing the  challenges
inherent in protecting a corporate network infrastructure and business information systems”
[31].   In  developing its  scoring method,  the competition divided scoring into three main
categories: critical services, injects, and written reports [32]. As suggested in the NCCDC
methodology, an effective exercise should use automated scoring for maintenance of critical
services. More important to this thesis  is the other two categories of scoring. Injects, the
methodology dictates, should have time limits, where teams are scored at certain points for
having achieved a certain part of the inject objective [32]. This methodology is helpful for
three main reasons. First, it enables the scoring body to handle the scoring burden. Second, it
allows teams to assess their current standing in real time. Third, it motivates teams who may
only be technically capable of completing parts of the inject. 
The third category of scoring is for written reporting. Teams should submit written reports for
their  responses  to  all  injects,  specifically  revolving  around the  forensics  portions.  These
reports should be scored according their inclusion of the following components: amount of
evidence uncovered, discussion of impacts, detail of procedure to locate/obtain the evidence,
and  supporting  proof  (e.g.  logs,  screen  shots,  IP addresses)  [32].  Teams  should  receive
additional points for using more practical and/or safer methods [21]. 
Locked Shields 2015 incorporated the timeline suggestion by using two phases for the digital
forensics scoring, a preliminary and a final report.  Teams were scored according the their
answers to a series of questions in each report [9]. This was in addition to the exercise's larger
automated functionality scoring. Teams also received time bonuses for the rate at which they
could complete the challenge [9]. An issue uncovered with this scoring method was that the
phases were not based on ability to perform parts of the exercise, and many teams struggled
with the initial acquisition phase [8]. Thus, it  would be beneficial this year to combine a
phased  scoring  method  with  the  tasks  the  exercise  requires  the  teams  to  perform.
Additionally,  the two-report method stressed the small forensics team in terms of time to
grade the reports, and the 2016 exercise is larger. 
Anti-Forensics
An additional layer to consider in developing the exercise methodology is the role of anti-
forensics, the process of frustrating the forensics investigation and the tools used to conduct
it.  Anti-forensics  techniques  have  three  main  focuses.  The  first  is  data  hiding,  in  which
methods are used to cover data related to the incident. This concerns things such as covering
script with images, hiding artifacts in file system slack space, and using confusing metadata
such as long file names [33]. The second main focus area is artifact wiping. In essence, this is
17
the step beyond artifact deletion, in which the artifact data is destroyed beyond the point of
simple recovery methods [33]. Finally, there is trail obfuscation, used to cover the tracks and
frustrate attribution, such as the use of anti-forensics techniques to confuse email forensics
[33]. 
In a state-based cyber exercise,  is it  worthwhile to employ such techniques? Certainly,  it
would enhance the challenge, but would it be too much of a challenge given the exercise
constraints and goals? Gary Kessler, Director of the Champlain College Center for Digital
Investigation proposes that it is essential, because the importance of anti-forensics techniques
increases as the allotted analysis time decreases, as the role of anti-forensics techniques is not
to cover something forever-- it is to slow it down enough for the incident to achieve its goal
[33]. Thus, a few day exercise seems to be the perfect testing ground for such techniques.
Additionally,  it  adds  an  additional  layer  of  challenge  for  the  teams with  more  advanced
digital forensics experts. 
Selected Methodology
The methodology the Locked Shields 2016 digital forensics challenge designers selected was
an isolated virtual network that is connected to the outside internet for Day 0 for the purposes
of performing the acquisition phase of the exercise. Included in the challenge network will be
multiple operating systems: Windows versions 7, 8, and 10 and Linux Ubuntu. The designers
decided to require competitors to acquire an image of the infected machine and submit proof
of the image's integrity. The designers chose to provide the teams with a pcap file, as well, in
order to test their abilities to perform network, in addition to system, forensics. They also
chose to incorporate a website and image for analysis. 
The inject will be handled in phases. First is proper acquisition. Teams will be able to start
this  process on Day 0 and given technical support by the digital  forensics team over the
communication channel for the exercise. Next is the analysis  phase, for which teams can
receive points for proper network, system, memory, and web forensics components. At the
end of Day 1 teams will be able to request technical answers in exchange for caps on the
number  of  points  they  could  earn  for  that  category.  Finally  is  the  forensics  report.  The
designers  chose  to  provide  teams  with  a  template  (see  Appendix  1)  and  a  sample  (see
Appendix 2) and require them to complete one for all evidence items analyzed. In this way,
even if teams do not have digital forensics expertise in certain areas, they will be able to at
least  complete  the  report  and  earn  some  points,  thus  motivating  them  to  attempt  the
challenge. Finally, some anti-forensics will be integrated into the inject in order to provide an
additional layer of challenge for more sophisticated teams. 
3.2 Test Case
Overall Scenario
As previously mentioned, digital forensics injects need to exist within the overall exercise
scenario for a government cyber exercise. The Locked Shields 2016 scenario involves three
States: Crimsonia, Berylia, and Revalia, three rival states within a local region. Essentially
the Red Team is the villain nation of Crimsonia, and the Blue Teams play the role of Berylia.
Revalia, while not initially at war with either, is a rival state within the region [34]. Berylia's
primary industry is drones, an industry that Crimsonia is interested in advancing. Crimsonia
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will  begin  attacking  the  civilian-operated  drone  facilities  of  Berylia,  and  the  Berylian
government deploys rapid reaction teams (the Blue Teams) to the facilities [34]. 
The scenario asks the digital forensics designers to create a situation in which Crimsonia
conducts a cyber attack on Revalia but tries to make it look like Berylia conducted the attack
in an effort to get Revalia to join the conflict on Crimsonia's side [34]. Berylia needs to prove
to Revalia that Crimsonia is the responsible party. Additionally, the exercise creators ask the
designers  to  show that  Crimsonia  has  been stealing  documents  related  to  drone  use  and
development from the facilities [34]. Locked Shields, like most large scale state-based cyber
exercises, is intended to mimic the worst case scenario where multiple attacks and exploits
are executed. This is why it is important that the digital forensics challenge contain multiple
layers [34]. 
Berylia's technical environment consists of various operating system types, including Linux,
Ubuntu,  Windows  8,  and  Windows  10.  The  exercise  coordinators  specified  that  the
compromised machine for the forensics challenge needs to be Windows 10. The coordinators
granted permission for the acquisition phase to take place on the exercise's preparation day,
Day 0. The rest of the challenge will take place over Day 1 and Day 2 (the entire exercise is
one preparation and two game-play days) [34].  
At this point in the challenge development, the thesis author and the other designers need to
answer the scenario questions from the methodology section:
How does the scenario dictate the sources of data?
There needs to be data with clues to Crimsonia present on the infected machine. Because
Berylia  is  the  team  conducting  the  investigation,  and  the  damaged  party  is  Revalia,
somewhere  between  the  creation  and  execution  of  the  attack,  artifacts  have  to  infect
something under Crimsonia's control that the blue teams can analyze. 
How does the scenario dictate the most likely available resources and tools?
All tools need to be available open source, as not all teams have licensed forensics programs.
Because the infected machine will be Windows 10, any tools used to deliver or execute the
attack need to exploit Windows 10 vulnerabilities. Additionally, because the network includes
various systems, it is advantageous for the delivery mechanism to be capable of delivering to
more than one operating system. 
How does the scenario create, maintain, and require communication channels?
The scenario requires Blue Teams to present proof of attribution of an attack to the victim
party, Revalia. This means that the teams need to log and keep proof of their acquisition and
analysis activities. It requires them to give a persuasive report to a legal team. Because the
scenario will  occur within an ongoing conflict  with Crimsonia,  prioritization may require
stop/start of analysis. There is also high risk of a loss of communication channels during the
analysis process. 
How does the scenario restrict and manage incident and response times?
Teams will be limited to the timeline of the exercise, with one day provided for acquisition
and two for analysis and presentation of findings. The incident response time may speed up
depending on escalation of attacks. Because there is a media team involved in the exercise
[34], digital forensics teams will be pushed to present findings quicker in order to prevent the
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entrance of Revalia into the conflict. This allows for the use of techniques that are speedier
over safer, such as live analysis.
How does the scenario shape the physical and logical environment?
There are at least three separate government networks involved in the scenario-- Crimsonia,
Revalia,  and Berylia.  This  means three public  address  spaces.  Operating systems will  be
heterogeneous.  The  teams  themselves  will  operate  from all  over  the  world  over  virtual
networks/ virtual machines. This means the acquisition will also be virtual. Teams need to
choose a form of connecting to the virtual machines, such as Secure Shell (SSH) or Remote
Desktop Protocol (RDP). 
Launching the Attack
In developing the injects,  step one is  mapping what  effects  of  the incident  would create
analysis challenges that mapped to the goals outlined in Section 1, the methodology discussed
above, and the overall Locked Shields 2016 scenario. The thesis author and her team of three
digital forensics designers have to create a challenge that fulfills as many of them as possible
within  the  confines  of  the  overall  Locked  Shields  2016  scenario.  This  means  that  any
scenario needs to incorporate an image, a web site, a Windows 10 machine, and a malware
file. The scenario itself needs to include three actors in the execution of the attack: Crimsonia,
Berylia, and Revalia. The easiest way to do this is to literally turn Berylia into the executor of
the attack by turning one or more of its machines into botnets, because “bots run almost
exclusively  on  Windows”  [35].  Ideally,  Crimsonia  will  deliver  malware  that  gives  it
command and control over a Berylian system and execute the attack on Revalia from the
machine.  Windows  10,  being  a  relatively  new  system,  is  fairly  secure  to  well  known
malware; however, it is important to recall that botnet programs originally were not intended
to be malicious. Remote control programs are advantageous to administrators, and thus they
exist  for  all  versions  of  operating  systems.  Malicious  attackers  take  advantage  of  these
programs and use them to gain control over systems to which they are unauthorized to access
[35]. Such a program could be used to gain control over a Crimsonian machine. 
According to  this  thesis' selected methodology,  the attack on Revalia  needs  to  include  a
website and an image. One of the most common forms of cyber attack conducted against
government entities is website defacement [36].  These attacks are often semantic attacks,
directed at disseminating false information and inciting fear or anger [36]. This matched the
scenario well. Thus, Crimsonia will deface the Revalian government website with an image
that  linked  to  Berylia.  For  this  to  occur,  the  Revalian  website  needs  some  type  of  a
vulnerability to exploit. The five most common web server vulnerabilities are remote code
injection, Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, format string vulnerabilities, cross-site
scripting, and username enumeration [37]. The purpose of the vulnerability is for Crimsonia
to deface the website with an image. SQL injection is enough to do this; however, if the
designers want the image to do anything beyond that (i.e. execute some type of code), then
the server also needs to be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. 
For Locked Shields, the thesis author and fellow designers tested a multitude of Wordpress
exploits and discovered one that works on Windows 10. This exploit relies on a compromised
plugin called RevSlider version 4.1.1. The attacker uses the infected machine to browse to the
victim  web-server  with  the  additional  command  /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?
action=revslider_show_image&img=../wp-config.php.  This  downloads  the  file  with  the
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database credentials, such that the attacker obtains login information for the server and uses it
to deface the website with the image [38].
Delivering the Attack
In order  for the attack to  occur  in  this  manner,  first  Crimsonia needs  to  turn a Berylian
computer into a Botnet. There are many ways to do this. The delivery mechanism has to be
one that adds evidence in a way that helped test the skills listed in Table 1. Because network
analysis is a key skill, the delivery mechanism should introduce network traffic. Additionally,
the environment contains multiple hosts and operating systems, so the delivery mechanism
has to  be easy to multiply and deliverable to  multiple operating systems,  thus ruling out
operating system specific deliveries. Options for this include e-mail, ftp, video chat, voice
over IP, advertising, and social media sites. Because in this type of exercise the designers
need to trick the victim machine user into downloading some type of malware, email is a
wise choice, essentially because it is easy to disguise an executable attachment as a pdf in
Microsoft Outlook.
For  the  specific  email,  it  needs  to  be  something  a  user  would  want  to  read  and  would
realistically download an attachment  from while  at  work.  Phishing emails  are  specifially
written to convince a target that they come from a trustworthy source [39]. The most common
subjects  of  these  emails  include  online  payments,  security  violations,  and  IT department
messages  [39].  It  is  important  that  the  email  make  sense  in  the  context  of  the  exercise
scenario. Given that the workers are drone research scientists in the Locked Shields scenario,
the  email  needs  to  be  clever  enough  to  trick  someone  whose  organization  is  heavily
concerned with security. In specifically targeted attacks like this one, attackers favor Spear
Phishing as the attack vector [40]. Spear Phishing campaigns use information gathered about
individuals to compose communications that appear personal and legitimate in nature [40].
That this email be intricately supported by the scenario is important, as previous exercise
reviews cited competing teams' decreased motivation when the event did not seem realistic
[41]. This also means there needs to be a background story on how the attacker conducted the
reconnaissance for the spear phishing attack. 
For Locked Shields 2016 this thesis' author and her fellow designers created an accountant
persona within the organization. The accountant has a Facebook account that registers her as
an employee in the drone organization, as does the victim machine user. The user and the
accountant are friends. Facebook and similar social networking sites are primary resources of
reconnaissance, because they list not only personal information that allow attackers to craft
convincing emails, but they also show the relationships between people that can be utilized in
a spear phishing attack [40]. In order to be plausible, the designers need to create some email
history between the accountant and the user from their work email accounts, supporting their
work relationship. For the attack, the attacker makes an email account that looks similar to
the victim's friend's legitimate email. This is normally done by changing one or two letters in
the domain name [42]. The email itself needs a legitimate excuse to have an attachment. For
this scenario, because the designers chose an accountant, they will send him an email from
his  friend the  accountant  asking if  he could  view the  invoice  that  she  received from an
executive  within  the  company.  The  real  domain  name  for  the  victim's  workplace
droneworld.site,  and the attacker's domain will  be dronevvorld.site,  replacing the letter  w
with two of the letter v. 
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This leads to the question of what malware to use in order to turn the target machine into a
bot. According to the head digital forensics inject developer for the NATO Cyber Centre of
Excellence,  the main criteria  for selecting the malware is  that  it  is  open source,  reliable,
supports file download and upload, enables encryption, and is easily customizable [38]. Open
source  malware  has  a  few advantages.  First,  the  code  is  simple  to  modify  to  meet  the
exercise's needs, including leaving clues. Second, it is usually accompanied by explanations
of its use. Finally, with open source malware there is little risk of an unknown developer
backdoor that could compromise the exercise [38]. This also supports the reliability of the
malware. The malware should also be proven reliable by testing it thoroughly for bugs. 
Features important to the malware include file upload and download, because the attacker
needs to deliver artifacts to the victim in order for it to upload the defacing image to the web
server. In order for the network analysis part of the exercise to present a decent challenge, it
also needs to be possible to encrypt the communication between the attacker and the bot [38].
Finally, because exercises requires the designers to leave specific clues for the teams, the
malware needs to be easily customizable.  Areas that the designer will  want to customize
include  metadata,  file  location,  ports,  and  process  names  [38].  A Remote  Access  Trojan
(RAT) that meets this criteria is the Qaesar RAT, which was used in the 2015 Locked Shields
and the designers decided to reuse in a modified manner in the 2016 exercise.  Additionally,
the RAT allows for encrypted file upload and download, an essential part of the scenario [38].
Once the RAT takes over the machine, it will use this encrypted channel to download files,
such as the defacing image. 
File Theft
Recall  that  a large constraint  in government cyber  exercises is  the need to  prioritize and
respond to political concerns. Locked Shields incorporated this by making the discovery of
leaked documents a priority. Thus, the teams will need to discover if and what documents the
Crimsonians  copied  from  the  infected  machine.  Because  the  RAT  uses  encrypted  file
download, this presents a challenge. The two day exercise is not enough time for teams to
decrypt the file upload, and just timestamps are not enough to identify copied documents,
since in the scenario the Windows 10 user is unaware of the system's compromise for an
extended period of time[38]. 
Thus,  the process of copying the files  needs  to leave clues.  Because a  main goal  of the
exercise is the use of system administration tools, this can be integrated into this section of
the exercise by executing a process. The thesis author crafted a python script that walks the
Windows 10 user's directories for a keyword in the file names (in this scenario, “drone”) and
copies those files to a new folder. When the attacker downloads the image to the victim, he
also downloads this script. After its execution, he will upload the entire folder using the RAT.
After file upload, the entire folder will be deleted. This entire process leaves various clues for
the teams. The script is shown below:
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import os
import shutil
global targetDir, keyword, destFolder
targetDir = "C:\\Users\\codeRunner"
destFolder = "C:\\Users\\codeRunner\\walk"
keyword = "drone"
def walkDir(targetDir, keyword, destFolder):
    counter = 0
    #print targetDir, keyword, destFolder
    for dirname, subdir, files in os.walk(targetDir):
        for fname in files:
            try:
                fname = fname.lower()
            except Exception:
                fname = fname
            try:
                if keyword in fname:
                    fullpath = os.path.join(dirname, fname)
                    newpath = os.path.join(destFolder,fname)
                    try:
                        shutil.copy(fullpath, newpath)
                    except Exception:
                        break
            except Exception:
                break
def main():
    global targetDir, keyword, destFolder
    walkDir(targetDir, keyword, destFolder)
main()
Anti-Forensics
Given  the  selected  methods  and  clues,  the  designers  must  decide  what  anti-forensic
techniques to employ in order to increase the challenge. Techniques available include those
focused  on  frustrating  acquisition,  stenography,  source  elimination,  fabrication  of  false
positives, data destruction, virtualization, memory related, and forensic tool exploitation [43].
Given the time constraints of a government exercise, the methods should not be unduly time-
consuming. This rules out most acquisition frustration, as this process has already proven
time consuming in such exercises [38]. Instead, the anti-forensics should to be applied to the
analysis portion itself. 
While several tools exist for this, the forensics challenge in Locked Shields 2015 proved too
difficult for many of the teams. The anti-forensics technique chosen that year was simple file
deletion. The files important to the attack were put in one folder that the attacker deleted and
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needs to be recovered. Teams failed to do this [38]; thus, this year the designers decided to
repeat the use of a single folder with all of the attacker's files that is deleted. For a greater
challenge, they will also employ metadata hiding methods. When the RAT executes it appears
in  the  running  processes,  but  the  designers  will  rename the  process  name to  a  common
Windows process, CCleaner, a free program to free up hard disk space by removing cookies
and temporary files  [38].  If  teams compare  the  time  of  opening the  malware  file  to  the
process execution will be obvious that the process is related to the attack. 
The Inject 
Now that the thesis author and her fellow designers possess the entire scenario, components,
and  evaluation  methods,  there  remains  the  written  inject  for  them  to  present  to  the
competitors. An inject is essentially the “task and purpose” [46] of the challenge. The written
inject needs to include the story of the scenario, which has to be both simple and realistic
[46]. It needs to boil down the scenario to the most important factors; further clarification and
information can be provided later if it becomes pertinent. The inject must articulate what the
main tasks are for the team to complete and specify the objects they will be provided in order
to complete them [46]. The object descriptions should include any technical information that
the teams need to perform the investigation. The inject also has to include the communication
methods of the findings, including the reporting format and destination. It is important to
include a specific timeline for completing the specified tasks and reports [46]. The Locked
Shields 2016 inject written by the thesis author is shown below: 
Attention!  RRT  is  requested  to  perform  a  digital  forensics
investigation to prove that the recent defacement of the Revalian
government web server was not performed by Berylia. At approximately
11:15 A.M. on 04 April 2016 revalia.gov was defaced. Revalia's web
server logs show that the attack came from an IP address used by the
Berylian  Armed  Forced  Drone  Control  Facility.  They  are  now
threatening to declare war against Berylia if it cannot prove it
was not responsible!  Your  team  is  tasked  with  performing  an
investigation on machines  within  the  subnet  of  the  facility
that is linked to the attack.  This  subnet  includes  the
following machines and accounts:
OS: Windows 10 (32bit)
User: Sheldon Jobs
Username: coderunner, password: LS16Sheldon
E-Mail: jobs.sheldon@droneworld.site, password: LS16M@il
Skype:jobs.sheldon@outlook.com, password: LS16M@il
IP: 10.1.10.17
OS: Windows 7 (32bit)
User: Raj Woz
Username: webmaniandevil, password: LS16Raj
E-Mail:woz.raj@droneworld.site, password: LS16M@il
Skype: woz.raj@outlook.com, password: LS16M@il
IP: 10.1.10.26
OS: Windows 8 (32bit)
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User: Howard Gates
Username: developerduck, password: LS16Howard
E-Mail: gates.howard@droneworld.site, password: LS16M@il
Skype: gates.howard@outlook.com, password: LS16M@il
IP: 10.1.10.54
 
OS: Ubuntu 15.10
User: Penn Dell
Username: adminfudd, password: LS16Penny
E-Mail: dell.penny@droneworld.site, password: LS16M@il
Skype: dell.penny@outlook.com, password: LS16M@il
IP: 10.1.10.22
In  order  to  conduct  your  investigation,  you  will  have  two
sources of evidence:  the  virtual  machines  cited  above  and
randomly recorded network  traffic  from  that  subnet.
Additionally, it is known that the Crimsonian  and  Revalian
government public IP address ranges are:
Crimsonia: 90.0.0.1-99.255.255.255.255
Revalia: 120.0.0.1-129.255.255.255.255
In addition to the analysis, you are tasked with writing a
forensics report  for  each  evidence  item  related  to  the  attack
(template and example  attached)  no  later  than  211000Z  (13:00
GMT+3) to white@mail.ex with  the  email  subject  line:  Scenario
Inject # Forensic Blue (Team Number) Report. The report may be
attached in text or pdf form. Remember,  the  results  of  your
investigation are vital to preventing Revalia  from  joining  forces
with Crimsonia! 
Hints
In 2015 the range of expertise amongst the teams was very widespread. For this reason the
2016 designers chose to provide teams with hint sheets upon request for pcap, hard disk, and
memory analysis. These hint sheets could not be full guides. This is because, as part of the
NATO program, a full workshop on the challenge and digital forensics in general will be
conducted a month after the exercise. Instead, the thesis author chose to create sheets of five
hints that pointed the teams towards where/what to search in their files (pcap, dump, image).
These five hints would be derived from the findings of the designers' test investigation (see
Appendix 3 for all three sheets).  In determining the conditions for the hints, a penalty to a
team's existing score would likely deter many of them from requesting hints, even when they
needed it. Instead, it might be wiser to put a cap on the number of points they could earn in
the category in which they received help,  such that  the teams can only earn 50% of the
category's points.
Team Investigator Machines
All teams will be requested to prepare and submit a virtual investigator machine. This ma-
chine can run any operating system that the teams wish. It needs to contain all of the forensic
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tools that they may need for the challenge (the specifics of which will not be disclosed prior
to the exercise commencement). Teams will be told that they cannot connect any USB or
other external devices in order to conduct the investigation, which prevents them for using
some software that requires such devices to function. All of the resources they require will
also need to be added to a share folder that the teams can access from the victim machine,
such that no additional software will to be downloaded to the victim machine, which would
taint the evidence [9]. 
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4. Results
In this section the thesis author helped map the artefacts of the example investigation to point
values for use in the test case exercise. She took part in answering team questions during the
exercise and scoring the final reports. During and after the exercise she logged first hand ob-
servations and conducted interviews with both participants and exercise staff for use in the
evaluation of the results. 
4.1 Expected Results
Investigation Process
At this point the design team has implemented the design described in Section 3. In order to
determine what the teams should find and the appropriate level of difficulty, first the digital
forensics  challenge  thesis  author  and  fellow  designers  needed  to  conduct  their  own
investigation to establish a baseline of expected findings. This investigation also helped the
designers in drafting the scoring guidelines and determining the difficulty of the tasks they
designed in the challenge. This investigation had to include the pcap file, hard disk analysis,
and memory dump analysis.
For the pcap, they began by filtering the traffic by port. From here it was easy to spot an
abnormal port, 88. Following the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stream of these ports
shows two sessions between the victim and the attacker. The traffic is encrypted; however,
the second session is initiated by the victim machine, explaining how RDP is possible despite
the firewall. The malware makes the connection from the victim, and the Windows firewall
allows for outgoing remote connections [38]. Since the main attack the team is tasked with
investigating, it is important to inspect HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic over port
80 to the web server. The inspection showed 50 sessions between the victim machine and the
web server. This traffic is unencrypted and quite revealing. It shows the failed and successful
logins to the server, including the credentials the attacker used. These streams give a very
detailed timeline of the attack and even showed the specific requests made to the server, one
of which reveals the vulnerability that the attacker exploited on the Revslider plugin. 
Following the attack, another stream shows the upload of a zip folder that contains an image.
If  this  image's  properties  are  analyzed (the  designers  used  EXIF editor),  then  the  image
properties show that the attacker embedded some type of executable code into the image, a
key indicator of its malicious intent. Unfortunately, the Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) script
added to the EXIF data of the defacing image was not properly included. Rather than adding
the code to the EXIF data itself, the designers needed to have saved it as a separate file that
the EXIF data calls. The former method results in a NO CODE EXECUTION ALLOWED
error. At this point, to fix the error would require redeploying the entire attack with a new im-
age and PHP file, and because the clues contained in the PHP script are duplicated in other
areas of the exercise (attacker country email and language), the designers decided not to re-
deploy. If the teams think to check the EXIF data they will still see the attempted code execu-
tion. 
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Figure 2: EXIF Data of the Defacing Image
The memory dump analysis is key to overcoming the main anti-forensics technique, metadata
manipulation.  Using Volatility  Framework  2.5,  the  ccleaner.exe  is  shown running with  a
suspicious mutant, CCle@ner2016. What visibly ties this process to the attack is that the
process  made a  connection  over  port  88,  the  port  connected  to  the  attacker  machine.  In
Startup Manager, there is a registry persistence associated with Shelby Cole (the persona used
to conduct the spear phishing attack). Note: Fig. 3 shows the results on the test machine,
Windows 64-bit, and in the exercise the victim machine is Windows 32-bit.
Figure 3: Systems Manager on Test Machine
A strings analysis of the process file for CCleaner gives a big clue to the teams: the phrase
“Crimsoni@2016” (note:  this  is also the encryption password for the connection).  It  also
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shows the transfer of a  number of documents  by extensions,  such as Portable Document
Format (PDF).
Hard disk analysis reveals the most information. For the test investigation the designers used
the following open source tools: SIFT Workstation, Plaso 1.4.0, vshadowmount. SIFT exports
outlook  emails  and  attachments  [46].  In  this  file  is  the  spoofed  email  address  of
cole.shelby@dronevvorld.site, different than the droneworld.site email domain of the victim.
The file also shows that there is an email attached within that email which contained a suspi-
cious object...which is the ccleaner.exe. Uploading this file to virustotal.com reveals its mali-
cious content. An analysis of the emails sent around the time of the attack shows that the vic-
tim sent one out stating that he would be away from work for a doctor's appointment, indicat-
ing that the activity during the time of the attack was not his own. Next, the designers used
the Debian package Plaso to view a superuser timeline [47]. This timeline analysis incorpor-
ates a number of skills from Table 1. 
A Microsoft warning reveals that when the user tried to open the document he received in his
email he received a warning that the attachment may contain viruses. There is a registry entry
with the temporary location for ccleaner.exe. From the prefetch file its execution created it is
possible to obtain the exact time of execution. The attacker created a number of files in the
CCleaner folder and also created hidden folders, buried in the Skype application folder, that
was used to house his files and also used to gather files using his python script. It is possible
to see, too, that it executed on the system from that hidden folder's location. Opening this
script file shows what the attacker was looking for (files related to “drone”) and gives clues to
the attacker (comments in Crimsonia's native language). Prefetch file analysis also reveals
that the attacker used a program called Mimikatz to look for credentials, and shortly after a
file called pass.txt was created in the hidden folder. It also shows the opening of files in note-
pad during the time of the web server attack. The RDP protocol enable time is shown in the
system log file, just before the time of the attack. The Windows event log (WinEVTX) gives
further  details  about  this  connection.  The Plaso tool  also displays  web browsing history,
which shows all of the browser commands executed visited during the attack, including log-
ins, file upload, and file deletion posts. See Table 2 for the hard disk analysis timeline. 
Score Sheet
This exercise is, in the end, a competition. Thus, the digital forensics challenge has been al-
located a set number of points by the exercise director. Recall that a multinational event has
to take special care that the scoring method is well-defined and fair [21]. Thus, the thesis au-
thor and her fellow designers created a table of all the artefacts and pieces of evidence (in-
cluding email addresses, IP addresses, running processes, hidden folders, ect) and associated
a set number of points for each. For the reports themselves, as an evaluation of writing is in-
herently subjective, they chose to use the same scoring method as Locked Shields 2015, in
which the teams were divided into four tiers of ranking for how well written and organized
their reports were and allocated points based on the tier. This was well received as fair during
Locked Shields 2015 [38]. Because similar methods may be used in future years, the exact
scoring sheet is not included in the report. 
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Date Info
30.03.2016 06:35:37 UTC
(tool: pffexport)
User received a message from suspicious e-mail address:
cole.shelby@dronevvorld.site
Delivery time: Mar 30, 2016, 05:15:52 UTC
Creation time: Mar 30, 2016, 06:35:37 UTC
E-mail  contained  Invoice  from  InterDrone.msg  which
contained suspicious ole object:
1_oledata.mso  (ccleaner.exe)  –  MD5sum:  341e2e4bab-
cbe675b6b4eddacfa13dec
File uploaded to virustotal.com – 2/54 (ole) 46/54 (exe)
30.03.2016 06:36:36 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Microsoft Office shows warning – Some objects contain
viruses… indicate that user tried to open suspicious at-
tachment.
30.03.2016 06:36:37 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Registry entry with temporary location of ccleaner.exe 
(c:\Users\ls16wsdev01\AppData\Local\Temp\ccleaner-
.exe)
/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM hive
30.03.2016 06:37:34 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
ccleaner.exe  appears  on  the  system
(c:\ProgramFiles\CCleaner\CCleaner.exe) 
30.03.2016 06:37:51 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Ccleaner.exe executed (-10sec), prefech file created
/Windows/Prefetch/CCLEANER.EXE-D4D76A60.pf
30.03.2016 07:05:54 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Attacker  populates  /ProgramFiles/CCleaner/folder  with
legit  files:  uninst.exe/ccleaner64.exe/Lang(folder  con-
tains multiple dlls)
30.03.2016 07:05:54 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
c:\Users\ls16wsdev01\AppData\Roaming\Skype\DataRw
Folders: ldp, lds, ldr (hidden)
30.03.2016 07:11:47 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Python script  appears on the system: lds.exe (location:
Skype\DataRw)
File contains crimsonian language in comments.
Script is design to search any document with “drone” in
its name and save it to Skype\DataRw\lds\ folder.
30.03.2016 07:13:38 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Python  script  executed  (-10sec),  Prefetch  file:  PY-
THON.exe
30.03.2016 07:13:57 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Python  script  populates  Skype\DataRw\lds  folder  with
drone documents
30.03.2016 07:20:46 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Mimikatz.exe appears on the system: Skype\DataRw\ldr\
30.03.2016 07:20:56 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Mimikatz.exe executed. Prefetch file: MIMIKATZ.exe
30.03.2016 07:20:57 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Pass.txt  created.  File  contain  user  (jobs.shel-
don@outlook.com) password sha1 hash.
Location: \Skype\DataRw\ldr\pass.txt 
30.03.2016 11:41:04 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
RDP protocol enabled on the system.
/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM hive
04.04.2016 07:25:46 UTC
(tool: pffexport)
Users  sends information about  doctor’s  appointment  at
0800 EET. Logs off around 0800. There is also browsing
history – google maps – hospital  in Tallinn… also pdf
was created with map how to get to hospital.
04.04.2016 08:10:01 UTC Berylia.zip appears on the system: Skype\DataRw\ldp
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(tool: Plaso 1.4.0) File contain image from defacement.
MD5sum  header.jpg:  36d8e0952f949fc2d35471f-
daacb3481
MD5sum  berylia.zip:61926c34166b651a72872bc0edef-
ddf7
04.04.2016 08:15:14 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
WinEVTX shows events  related  to  RDP connection to
the maichne. Connection from 10.1.10.17 indicates pos-
sible malware involvement (reverse proxy).
04.04.2016 08:15:32 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
WinEVTX shows events  related  to  RDP connection to
the maichne. Successful connect – resolution 1024/768,
user:  jobs.sheldon@outlook.com,  fits  timeframe  of  the
second session (92.223.16.65) from pcap.
04.04.2016 08:16:02 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User accessing website  revalia.gov – same event in pcap
04.04.2016 08:16:27 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User accessing – revaila.gov/wp-login.php – possible log
in attempt
04.04.2016 08:17:25 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User  running  url  –  revalia.gov/wp-admin/admin-
ajax.php?action=revslider_show_image&img=../wp-con-
fig.php as a result admin-ajax.php is being downloaded.
04.04.2016 08:17:26 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
admin-ajax.php appears on the system: c:\Users\ls16ws-
dev01\Downloads\admin-ajax.php
contains configuration of the wordpress web server with
plain text credentials to database: wpadmin/redhat2012
04.04.2016 08:18:33 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User accessing – revaila.gov/phpmyadmin – possible log
in attempt
04.04.2016 08:18:34 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
NOTEPAD.exe  prefetch  file  indicates  user  opened  ad-
min-ajax.php file in order to get the sql server credentials
04.04.2016 08:19:57 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User accessing – revaila.gov/wp-login.php – possible log
in attempt, pcap indicates successful log in attempt
04.04.2016 08:20:45 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User  accessing  berylia.zip  –  Skype\DataRw\ldp\beryli-
a.zip
04.04.2016 08:20:47 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User uploading berylia.zip - URL: Visited: codeRunner-
@http://revalia.gov/wp-admin/update.php?action=up-
load-theme
04.04.2016 08:20:51 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User  activated  new theme:  URL:  http://revalia.gov/wp-
admin/themes.php?activated=true
04.04.2016 08:21:48 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User deletes content from revalia.gov:
URL:  Visited:  codeRunner@http://revalia.gov/wp-
admin/post.php?post=2&action=trash
04.04.2016 08:21:51 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
Visited:  codeRunner@http://revalia.gov/wp-
admin/post.php?post=5&action=trash
04.04.2016 08:22:11 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User logged out from revalia.gov:
URL: http://revalia.gov/wp-login.php?loggedout=true
04.04.2016 08:22:18 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
User  checks  if  the  attack  was  successful  by accessing
revalia.gov
04.04.2016 08:23:42 UTC
(tool: Plaso 1.4.0)
WinEVTX shows events  related  to  RDP connection to
the machine. Possible log off.
Table 2: Hard Disk Analysis Timeline
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4.2 Evaluation Method
Nine key steps are involved in evaluating the effectiveness of an exercise: [48]
1. Appoint evaluator head
2. Organize resources
3. Formulate questions
4. Prepare evaluators
5. Observe the exercise
6. Analyze the data
7. Disseminate the report
8. Process lessons learned
9. Incorporate into the next exercise
The author of this thesis is in charge of developing evaluation materials for the exercise. In
terms of resources, the best way to gather feedback is to use the same platform used for all of
the exercise's communications, the online web portal, because the teams would already be
providing other documents and reports over this platform [38]. The formal questions need to
be linked specifically to the exercise objectives [48]. For this reason, the author turned the
objectives in Fig.1 into the feedback questions. One issue with intense cyber exercises is that
by the end of the exercise teams tend to be exhausted and unlikely to give thorough written
feedback.  In  Locked  Shields  2015,  during  the  exercise  question  and  comment  session
immediately following the exercise,  few teams took the opportunity to comment.  Thus, a
rating system instead of open ended questions is advisable (See the Summary section for the
questionnaire). For the test case, this sheet will be added onto the web portal for delivery to
the evaluators on the final day of the exercise. This type of evaluation provides experiential
feedback, which is a valuable way to test what the creators' expectations of the exercise were
against the experiences of the participants [48]. Primary materials also provide a good basis
for evaluation, and from the exercise this will come mostly from logs of the communication
channels. There is a communication chat room specifically for the Blue Teams to discuss
forensics and also ask questions to the forensics team. These logs will serve as records of
what the teams found most challenging. 
It  is  also  important  to  involve  in  the  evaluation  the  participants  not  directly  tied  to  the
forensics exercise. Recall that State-based exercises first must serve their political masters,
which makes it all more important that the exercises strategic leaders feel that the forensics
challenge fulfilled their goals. Essentially, the evaluation needs to “involve the management”
[48]. For this, personal interviews during and after the exercise will be used. Evaluators must
also consider  where they should place themselves during the exercise itself.  The Locked
Shields  digital  forensics  designers  will  be  physically  with  the  infrastructure  (Green)  and
scenario (Yellow, and White) teams. In this way it will be possible to both manage and track
the technical moves of the Blue Teams and also see how the rest of the exercise is playing out
as a whole and the forensics challenge's role inside of it. It is not considered good practice for
the evaluators to be too close to the challenge's participants, because “this can disturb them”
[48]. Even so, most of the participating Blue Teams for such a large State exercise are not
physically located in the same place as the rest  of the teams, connecting remotely to the
exercise network. 
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4.3 Observations
Here begins the reflection and analysis part of the thesis. At this point, the challenge has been
fully designed and implemented. 
Day 0
Originally, the start of the exercise was scheduled for 09:00 on the first day, at which time the
teams should have download the pcap file that was uploaded to the web portal and started
determining what  additional acquisitions (memory and hard disk) they should make. The
overall exercise included a half hour kick-off web session, at the end of which the gamenet
would open. The web session started and ran late, delaying the teams' access to the network
by over an hour; however, the teams were able to use this time to download and begin pcap
analysis. At the end of the web session, teams needed to send a communication check into the
White team, and only once all teams had successfully communicated could the White team
could release the inject, for purposes of fairness. Multiple teams contributed to a delay of
another hour. 
Once the White Team sent the competing teams the inject, the thesis author intended for them
to  use  the  pcap  in  order  to  decide  what  machine(s)  in  the  victim  subnet  they  should
investigate. This would enable the teams to perform all the acquisitions and begin analysis on
this  first  day.  During  this  time  period  a  couple  of  teams  experienced  issues  with  their
investigator  machines,  mostly  issues  concerning  their  familiarity  with  the  machine
environment that had picked. One hour before the gamenet would be shut down for the day,
teams  were  asked  to  send an  update  of  their  acquisition  status.  To the  all  of  designers'
surprise,  multiple  teams  reported  having  a  certain  number  of  memory and/or  hard  disks
acquired out of four. Essentially, many teams did not use the pcap in order to narrow down
the acquisition requirements as the designers intended them to do. At the end of the day,
about  one  quarter  of  the  teams  had  completed  acquisition,  one  half  of  the  teams  in  the
progress of making acquisition, and one quarter of the teams struggling to understand how to
make the acquisitions.
Day 1
On the first day of the full exercise, when the rest of the exercise's injects began, there again
was  a  delay in  opening  the  gamenet,  but  this  time only by thirty  minutes.  Many teams
complained about not having enough time to perform the acquisitions, an issue linked to the
fact that they were attempting to acquire hard disk images and memory dumps from all four
machines in the victim subnet. Still, a few teams pulled far ahead, with one completing the
challenge by the end of the morning, heading into a bonus IPv6 network traffic inject in the
afternoon, unrelated to the main digital forensics challenge. This bonus challenge came from
a developer outside of the digital forensics challenge design team and focused on data ex-
filtration by splitting packets between IPv4 and IPv6 channels. 
One team even uncovered a flaw in the inject design: the designers had used an outside mail
server for all of the machines involved in the scenario (attacker, victims, and third parties),
and the team found this address in the header information for all of the packets. Although this
did not affect the challenge much, as all of the packets had this header uniformly, it is an
oversight to be corrected for next year's challenge. 
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In the afternoon teams were reminded that they could take advantage of the hint sheets if
needed. One team asked how to receive these sheets but did not follow up with a request.
Meanwhile, the media team from the exercise placed pressure on the forensics analysts by
running numerous stories about the supposed Berylian attack on Revalia and the teams' lack
of evidence for disavowing Berylian involvement. In the late afternoon, the designers opened
each team's investigator machines to look at the teams' progress. A few teams were actively
analyzing memory and hard disks, many were still performing acquisition, and some teams
were  logged  out  of  the  machine,  indicating  either  commencement  or  foregoing  of  the
challenge. One hour before the close of gamenet for Day 1, teams were sent out another
reminder of the hint sheets. One team replied right away,  asking for the pcap hint sheet.
Another requested clarification for how it affected the scoring and chose not to take a hint.
At the end of Day 1, status reports were again gathered from the teams. Four teams stated
they were  finished  analysis  and  in  the  progress  of  writing  their  reports.  Multiple  teams
responded that they had completed acquisition and were in the analysis phase. A few teams
were  still  struggling  to  make acquisitions.  The thesis  author  advised  them over  the  chat
channel to shift their main focus to the pcap analysis. 
Day 2
At the open of gamenet on Day 2, another team requested a hint sheet, this time for memory
dump analysis. Another team requested this same memory hint sheet two hours later. The first
reports arrived approximately two hours before the deadline. It became very apparent early
on in the scoring process the wide spread of results. A few teams scored nearly 75% of the
total  possible  points,  while  a few teams barely managed to scrape any points at  all.  The
reports themselves were varying in both quality and composition. A couple teams submitted
novel-length reports of appendices and a couple with single page findings. For scoring, the
designers had created a point category for report quality, in which teams were divided into
one of four categories based on the overall organization and composition of their reports. The
winning team's report was not the longest, but it clearly over-viewed the findings, contained
all the important details, and had only the pertinent supporting appendices. 
After submitting the scores, the thesis author received a desperate message from one of the
teams asking why they had not received any points for memory or hard disk analysis. Upon
investigation, she and her fellow designers discovered that they had only received a report for
the pcap analysis. The White team had missed the report in its email in-box. The report was
quickly printed and graded in order to adjust the team's score. This is a clear indicator that
there needs to be an acknowledgement of report receipt set up next year. After this adjust-
ment, the scores for the team were considered final. 
4.4 Scores
The  final  scores  are  summarized  in  Fig.6,  broken  down  by  category  of  scoring.  The
maximum score for the challenge including the bonus network analysis inject was 10,600
points. The highest scoring team earned 7,750 points, and the lowest scoring team earned 50
points. When the scores are separated among the categories of scoring, it appears that the
highest scoring teams excelled in hard disk analysis. These teams also had the highest scores
for well written and organized reports. 
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Figure 6: Digital Forensics Challenge Scores
Many teams struggled with acquisition and instead focused their efforts on pcap analysis.
Thus, earning points outside of the pcap analysis gave the winners a leg up on the competi-
tion. Additionally, many of the teams focused more on the attack on the web server than on
the attack that allowed Crimsonia to use Berylia to conduct the attack, missing the point of
the investigation: not to show what happened but how it happened. The teams with the best
reports earned a lot of points for clearly showing the whole story, from the spear phishing to
the use of the RAT to the Wordpress vulnerability used to attack the website. A large portion
of the teams failed to find the second attack they were asked to investigate: the suspected file
theft. The winning teams discovered the python script that copied these files, as well as the
clues inside the code that pointed towards its Crimsonian authors. 
4.5 Analysis of Results
The big question is, how well did the inject tested the skills the thesis author designed it to
test and how effective was the of the scenario. For this analysis, the thesis author combined
her  first  hand observations  with the exercise  chat  logs,  written  participant  feedback,  and
personal interviews with multiple management level participants from the exercise. 
Category 1: Technical Skills
1. Ability to make an acquisition from hard disk
Teams needed to acquire a hard disk image of the Windows 10 machine in order to find a
large number of the artifacts. All the teams except one managed to at least make one hard
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disk acquisition, and the one that did not had other technical difficulties that kept it from
performing the acquisition.  
2. Ability to make memory acquisitions
Teams also needed to acquire memory dumps in order to find artifacts related to the processes
of  the  malware  sample.  Nearly  half  of  the  teams  did  not  make  a  single  memory dump
acquisition. This is an indicator that the scenario needs to place more emphasis on the need to
acquire such a dump. 
3. Ability to choose and apply appropriate forensics tools
For their investigator machines, teams created their own virtual investigator machines and
submitted  them to  the  digital  forensics  team.  Most  of  the  teams  successfully  chose  and
installed analysis  software for these machines,  with the exception of the losing team that
unwisely chose  a  new platform with  which  both  they and  the  challenge  designers  were
unfamiliar. Newcomers to the exercise were less prepared with analysis software, but this is
something that they will improve only with experience [49]. 
4. Ability to read NTFS
The machine hard disk that the teams needed to investigate was the Windows 10 machine.
Even if the teams chose to analyze the wrong machine, three of the four hosts on the victim
subnet had NTFS file systems. 
5. Ability to find and recover deleted files
All of the attacker's tools and documents were placed in a folder that the attacker deleted at
the end of the attack. Teams could recover all of these files through the proper reading and
carving of the Windows 10 file system. The teams with the highest points were those with the
best  analysis  of  the  Windows 10 hard  disk  image,  a  good  indication  that  this  skill  was
properly tested with the inject.
 
6. Ability to analyze pcap files
The very first thing the challenge designers provided the teams was the pcap file. About 25%
of the total exercise points came from pcap analysis. As stated before, the best teams realized
that not only did they need to analyze the pcap file for artifacts but also for clues as to what
hosts in the victim subnet they needed to analyze. Only one team failed to obtain any points
from the pcap file.
 
7. Ability to read Windows system logs
One scored area that only a few teams managed to obtain points in was Windows alerts. A
reading  of  the  Windows  event  logs  showed  that  when  the  victim  opened  the  malware
attachment, his computer generated a warning. Considering that only a couple teams located
this, and the rest of the artifacts could be found through other analysis means, more artifacts
should be placed in the logs.
 
8. Ability to analyze Windows prefetch files
The teams with the best timelines used Windows prefetch files to show the exact times of
execution, not only for the malware, but also for other programs the attacker used, such as
using Mimikatz to search for passwords and using notepad to view and alter the web server
credentials. A large portion of the teams found at least one of these prefetch files to reference
in their timelines. 
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9. Ability to locate malware files
Recall that an anti-forensics technique the challenge employed was masquerading the RAT as
a legitimate program, CCleaner. A little less than 50% of the teams located and pinpointed as
malware  this  ccleaner.exe.  Considering  that  anti-forensics  was  also  used  to  cover  the
malware, 50% is a good indicator that the skill was appropriately tested [49]. Less of the
teams noted the location from which this malware was executing,  and this oversight also
prevented teams from seeing the attacker populate that folder.  There should be increased
emphasis on the physical location of the executable in future exercises. 
10. Ability to use hash verification
Teams should have provided hash verification for every file acquired, found, and carved. This
included the hard disk and memory dump acquisitions, malware file, zip file, and defacement
image file. Almost every team provided hash values for disk image and memory dumps they
acquired. Many did not think to hash the pcap file after downloading it. The winning teams
not only did this but also provided hash values for every file they found pertaining to the
attack. 75% of the teams provided at least one hash value; however, the importance of using
hash  values  throughout  the  investigation  needs  to  be  better  stressed.  For  starters,  teams
should  have  been  rewarded  on  the  score  sheet  for  using  hash  verification  on  the  pcap
download. 
11. Ability to use Windows system administration tools
The  big  artifact  the  teams  should  have  found  using  system  administration  tools  is  the
persistence  entry for  the  malware  file.  Almost  50% of  the  teams found this,  most  using
Startup Manager. Many teams did not think this skill was tested enough, and in future other
artifacts should be set to test this skill [50].
 
Category 2: Procedural Skills
1. Ability to use logging tools
This skill was not really tested well. Although teams had the opportunity to use logging tools
in their investigation, none used them, or at the very least none presented their use in their
reports.  This  should  be  stressed  somehow  in  order  to  encourage  better  investigation
documentation.
2. Ability to describe forensics activities performed
The ability to write a good forensics report really set teams apart. The inject was designed
such that the teams were not only asked to find artifacts but also to produce a report that
would help their team convince the afflicted third party not to attack them. The designers
gave the teams templates to help them draft this report. They received mixed feedback on
these templates. Some of the teams appreciated the separation between evidence items (i.e. a
different report for each evidence item analyzed). This approach was cited as being more
legal in approach [49]. Yet, teams with more incident response experience found the division
of reports  distracting to the overall story of the incident [50]. Teams drafted both reports
shorter than half a page and novel-length reports. The best reports very well described the full
attack. One way to better test this skill may be less stress on appendices and more on the
overview of findings, as many teams submitted pages out output from their analysis reports
with little description of what they indicated. 
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3. Ability to present data logically
Most of the teams agreed that the reporting requirement did test  their  ability to logically
present data, because it stressed the need for good timelines [50]. From the perspective of the
exercise coordinators, the skill was tested most with the blind scoring methodology. Teams
were not given detailed explanations of how they would be scored; thus, they could not tailor
their efforts just towards earning points [34]. This forced the teams to try and logically show
in their reports their technical expertise and the importance of the activities they performed
[50].
 
4. Ability to document forensics procedures
A review of the chat logs shows that teams asked about the level of detail to be provided in
the report. Chat logs show the designers stressing to the teams the importance of repeatability,
which  was  also  emphasized  in  the  template.  Repeatability  is  the  best  way to  test  if  the
procedures were detailed enough [18]. 
Category 3: Teamwork
1. Ability to prioritize the investigations
A major intention of the inject design was to force the teams to prioritize investigating the
most suspicious machine given the small time window the teams had to turn in their report.
The  inject  tested  this  well,  because  the  winning  teams  realized  this  and  focused on  the
Windows 10 machine[50]. Another area in which the inject successfully tested prioritization
was in applying pressure to the teams through the use of media injects. Some teams felt the
challenge almost forced this too much, because they felt very time crunched [50]. However,
that many of the teams achieved close to 75% of the points through proper prioritization
shows it was about the right level of pressure [49]. 
2. Inter-team communication
At one point during the exercise, a team leader expressed frustration with the digital forensics
designers for communicating directly with the digital forensics experts on the blue teams in
requesting status updates. They felt that this skipped proper chain of command. This raises a
question of if it is more realistic to speak directly to the technical experts or go through a
management level and force more inter-team communication. Although not ideal, it is more
realistic to insert a management level for state-based exercises [50].
 
3. Designation and division of roles and responsibilities
Ideally,  the  teams  should  have  divided  up  the  labor  to  look  at  different  evidence  items
simultaneously.  It  appears that the best teams had someone analyzing the pcap while the
others worked on acquisition. Teams that scored poorly failed to make this division of roles.
One of  the  best  teams,  however,  was a  one-man operation,  so it  was  possible  to  do the
challenge without too much division of labor. An idea for improvement would be using more
than  one  victim  machine  in  the  subnet,  but  this  would  also  increase  the  acquisition
requirements with which the teams already struggled [49]. 
Level of Technical Difficulty
The wide differentiation between teams makes it hard to judge the difficulty of the challenge
based on total scores alone (which range from 50 to 7750). Still, when the scores are plotted
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(see Fig. 6), it appears to be well balanced. The highest scoring team earned about 75% of the
possible points, which is good, because it means the most capable teams could perform most
of the tasks but were still challenged [49]. Unlike last year's Locked Shields, in which none
of the teams managed to find a large number of artifacts, every scored item was uncovered by
at least one team this year [49]. This shows improvement in designing a better inject and
better score sheet. 
In terms of specific difficulties, the forensic challenge chat room logs show that teams first
stumbled in connecting to the virtual machines. It took them longer than anticipated to realize
they needed to disable the firewall, but leaving this firewall up was an acceptable hurdle,
because it was an obstacle all the teams without other technical issues managed to surmount.
Next, teams struggled with managing their time. Recall that at the end of Day 0, the designers
realized that the teams were trying to acquire images and memory dumps of all four of the
machines. The written challenge inject clearly indicated that they should only acquire these
from relevant machines. This thesis author provided an extra hint in the chat room that the
pcap could help narrow their acquisition requirements: “pcap analysis may narrow down you
acquisition  requirements.”  This  should  be  more  clearly hinted  at  in  the  inject  directions.
Technically  speaking,  almost  all  the  teams  were  able  to  make  hard  disk  and  memory
acquisitions. 
In terms of the analysis, the lowest scoring team found only the attacker IP address. Teams
received in the inject the IP range for the Crimsonian government, and the team was able to
search for IP addresses in this range and follow the sessions between them and the victim
subnet. The next lowest scoring team was able to find the web attack in the pcap by locating
the uploaded theme.  Both of  these teams earned points  only for analyzing the pcap (the
second lowest  scoring team was able  to  acquire  but  not  analyze  the memory).  The next
highest scoring team also found the attacker's failed and successful log-ins to the web server.
On the other end of the spectrum, the highest scoring team found nearly everything in the
pcap except for the image file with EXIF data. Only one team was able to locate this image
inside of the uploaded zip file and the attempted code execution. This indicates that the pcap
challenge was appropriate in difficulty with the image being obtainable but very difficult.
Altogether, there was nothing in the pcap that was scored that went undiscovered. A step up
in the challenge would be successfully adding the PHP script to the image. 
The highest scoring team did not excel in memory analysis, but many teams did. The biggest
miss by the teams that did the best in memory analysis was in locating and noting the parent
process and mutant related to the malware process. However,  a few teams did find these
items. Out of a possible 1350 points for memory analysis, almost half of the teams obtained
nearly 50% of the points. This indicates the designers could slightly increase the challenge for
the higher performing teams. In terms of hard disk analysis, as noted above, the teams that
scored best overall scored best in hard disk analysis.  One of the biggest point losses for many
of the teams was not finding the hidden folder where the attacker put all his tools, including
the python files. Still, it is likely that this is more of an issue of the teams forgetting about
that part of the inject, not a technical inability to find it [49]. Few teams noted the original
folder  to  which  the  attacker  downloaded  the  malware,  and  only  one  team  showed  the
additional  files  with  which  the  attacker  also  populated  it.  This  attempt  at  covering  the
malware with legitimate files may be a bit too complicated for an exercise of this length, as it
involves looking further back into the history of the attack. 
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The winning team lost the most points for not discovering the RDP session information that
showed the malware created a remote session back to the attacker for the duration of the web
server attack, but many of the other teams did locate and explain the importance of these
sessions in their reports. The most difficult part about these sessions was that the sessions
were encrypted. The challenge did not score decrypting these sessions formally, but if teams
were able to do some of the encryption then they were given bonus points. Two of the teams
managed to partly decrypt the traffic. This should remain a bonus and not part of the formal
inject, as even the top scoring teams could not finish the task.
Another consideration for difficulty was the hint sheets. Only three teams requested them.
The teams reported being scared by the penalty of only being able to earn 50% of the points
in that category [50]. In practice, this would have affected barely any of the teams, anyway,
based on their scores. The hint sheets did help those three teams obtain some points in the
category, in one case up to 25% of the points in that category where they would have earned
less than 10% [50]. This indicates that the hint sheets were well crafted but the way they were
advertised was not, and the chosen the penalty needs to be adjusted. Although the cap method
is good in theory, it actually did not affect any of the teams that used the hint, as all scored
under 50% of the possible points regardless, and the 50% number scared too many of the
teams from requesting help. 
Timing
If there is one certainty to conclude from this test run, it is that the use of an exercise's prepar-
ation day for acquisition is essential. Without this time most of the teams would never have
made it to the analysis portion. At the start of the acquisition phase, the designers gave the
teams the pcap file. This was intended to help the teams decide what was pertinent to acquisi-
tion; the teams that realized this gained a vital time advantage, and this should be maintained
for future exercises. While many of the teams complained that there was not enough time for
acquisition, these were the teams that tried to perform hard disk images and memory dumps
from all four machines in the victim subnet. The teams that used the pcap appropriately fin-
ished acquisition early in Day 0. 
The teams had until about halfway through Day 2 to turn in their report. The idea behind this
was that it gave the designers four hours to collect and score the reports before the end of the
exercise.  Even  with  this  allocation,  the  designers  finished  scoring  the  reports  just  thirty
minutes before the end of the exercise, and they missed a report that they had to go back and
regrade after the exercise ended. It would actually be preferable to push the report deadline
up, having the teams submit them an hour earlier. This hour could be used for verifying the
scoring. This should be acceptable, because teams can spend the night between Day 1 and
Day 2 writing the report if they are smart. Even though they cannot connect to the gamenet,
they have all of the files (pcap, hard drive, memory dump) locally. With this hour, at five
hours and twenty, it would give the scoring team approximately fifteen minutes per report.
One of the most frustrating aspects of this year's forensics challenge was that multiple of the
teams wasted time getting acquainted with their investigator machine and the virtual environ-
ment during Day 0. One team never comprehended how to use its chosen machine. For other
areas of the exercise, teams are given an acquaintance period, a few weeks before the exer-
cise. It would be helpful to force the digital forensics experts of the teams to submit their in-
vestigator machine prior to this period and have them get acquainted with it at the same time
that the rest of their team is getting familiar with the gamenet environment [49]. 
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Place in the Overall Exercise
Remember that a key part of evaluating such an exercise is to involve the management levels.
The leader of the Green Team, responsible for the technical infrastructure of the exercise, 
noted that the integration of the digital forensics infrastructure and the rest of the gamenet 
was quite weak. It would add to the realism and stress of the scenario if the events in the rest 
of the gamenet took some affect on the subnets where the digital forensics challenge took 
place [51]. The digital forensics scenario this year was more involved with the storyline of 
the rest of the scenario, particularly with adding in the file theft piece [49]. A data collector 
for the exercise commented that it would be interesting to make some of the data ex-filtration 
important information the teams need elsewhere in the exercise [52]
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      5. Summary
In this section the thesis author drew conclusions on the results of the test case and used
interviews  with  exercise  participants  and  management  to  determine  sites  for  future
development of cyber defense exercises similar to Locked Shields.
5.1 Conclusion
This  thesis  set  out  to  establish  the  main  goals  of  a  digital  forensics  challenge  in  a
multinational cyber defense exercise, develop a complete scenario for which to test them, and
implement the challenge into a larger cyber defense exercise. The thesis author joined a team
of designers at the NATO Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in designing, developing, and
implementing  the  digital  forensics  challenge  for  the  2016  Locked  Shields  cyber  defense
exercise. She then used first hand observations, written participant feedback, management
level interviews, and competition scores to evaluate the effectiveness of the challenge. 
Of  the  goals  the  thesis  established  in  Table  1,  the  challenge  most  strongly  tested  pcap
analysis, prefetch analysis, hard disk and memory acquisition, timelining, prioritization, and
presentation  of  findings.  The  areas  that  need  the  most  improvement  are  in  systems  log
forensics, memory dump analysis, case logging, and description of activities. In particular,
the thesis found that what a forensics report should look like varies greatly across teams, and
there needs to be a good balance between providing guidance to inexperienced teams and
leaving leeway for more experienced teams to describe the investigation in the method that is
most logical for the scenario. 
Areas in which the challenge excelled in terms of overall design and implementation included
levels of difficulty and variety of tasks. The highest scoring team was still challenged, and the
lowest scoring team still managed to obtain some points. The vast array of scores reflects the
vast diversity of level of expertise across the teams. Areas in which the challenge fell short
are  in  overall  pre-exercise  preparation,  such  as  the  need  for  the  teams  to  have  time  to
familiarize  themselves  with  the  virtual  environment,  and  the  need  for  more  third  party
oversight, such as having a test run performed by individuals outside of the design team and
having a check on the exercise scoring in order to  prevent oversights such as the nearly
missed report from one of the teams in Locked Shields 2016. 
5.2 Future Work
Counter Forensics
One area for future development is the use of counter forensics, which is a division of anti-
forensics aimed directly at frustrating forensics tools [53]. One such method is a compression
bomb.  Compression  bombs  are  “small  data  files  that  consume  a  tremendous  amount  of
storage when uncompressed” [53]. The purpose of these bombs is to cause forensics tools to
fail or crash [54]. They can be highly frustrating to forensics investigations; yet, they are also
easy to detect with anti-virus and other scanners if the bomb has a known signature [54]. The
most well known compression bomb is the infamous 42.zip, which contains 42 kilobytes of
compressed data and is widely available for download on the internet [54]. This is an ideal
tool, because it is easy to both implement and detect. One idea is to disguise this zip as a file
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that the analysts want to analyze (such as the malware sample). The designers chose not to
use this bomb this year, as the 2015 Locked Shields proved so difficult for many teams, but
given the increased performance levels in 2016 it is viable for next year.
Customization
An early intention in the design of this inject was to use an anti-forensics tool that would hide
the malware from acquisition tools. Dimentia is a tool that supports two methods of data
hiding: user-mode, which hides the program from hard disk acquisition tools, and kernel-
mode, which hides the program from memory acquisition tools [43]. The issue this year is
that both modes require all of the parameters to be specified at the time of program execution,
which reveals to  the investigators everything about what the program is  hiding [30].  For
future use, the program could be customized to include the parameters of the program within
the executable code. This requires the design team to have a programmer skilled in .NET. The
RAT that was employed in this test case scenario was also written in .NET. It would be nice
to customize the program to have additional attribution clues. 
Attack Vector
The last two Locked Shields cyber exercises have used email as the attack vector. While this
is  very realistic,  cyber  exercises should not  become predictable  [50].  An infection vector
category predicted to grow immensely over the coming years is the use of Universal Serial
Bus (USB) devices [55]. One of the most infamous examples of this is Stuxnet, malware that
destroyed uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, which was
introduced to the facility's computer system through a USB [55]. Many computer anti-virus
programs  detect  and will  not  open anything from a  USB without  user  approval  [55].  A
possible tool to get around this is the USB Rubber Ducky. This is a hacker tool that tricks the
computer into thinking it is a keyboard [56]. Best of all, it works across multiple platforms,
including Windows, Android, Mac, and Linux[56]. Another bonus is that the programming of
the device is easily customizable. Such a method should be considered as a future attack
vector. 
Network Forensics
This year there was a bonus challenge involving IPv6. Teams had to investigate a data ex-
filtration incident and figure our the source and destination IP addresses, type of ex-filtration
method, and content of the ex-filtration. Only one team fully completed the challenge, but a
handful at least solved part of it. The method used both IPv4 and IPv6 to split the packets
among  stacks.  A suggestion  from one  of  the  exercise  contributors  would  be  to  have  an
encryption key or important file ex-filtrated in this way for next year's exercise [52]. 
Test Run Inclusion
The Locked Shields exercise has an annual test run about one month before its scheduled ex-
ecution. Since its inception, the digital forensics challenge has not been a part of the test run.
Although the digital forensics team managed to do its own baseline investigation to develop
the score sheet, the investigation is biased by the fact that the investigators know what for
what they are searching [49]. Cyber exercises should aim for a third party to perform the in-
vestigation prior to the exercise's execution. It would help not only gauge the difficulty but
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also get a more accurate idea of how long the challenge will take. For instance, the score
sheet for Locked Shields 2016 awarded very little points just for acquisition, assuming this
would be an easy task. It would have been more appropriate to give more points to this, in-
cluding points for prioritizing the acquisitions of the Windows 10 machines.  
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Appendix
I.       Forensics Report Template
Forensics Analysis Report
Blue Team:
Evidence Item:
I. Overview
The overview must include the reason for the analysis examination and a summary of the
most important findings of the analysis.
II. Items
List  here  all  hardware and software  used  during  the  acquisition  and analysis,  including
version number.
III. Acquisition
The acquisition section must  include all  steps  taken to  preserve the evidence (e.g.  write
blocker)  and  hash  verification  (e.g.  SHA-1,  MD5)  of  the  images.  For  network  analysis
(PCAP) include file download and verification. 
IV. Findings
The  findings  section  must  include  all  analysis  types  performed  on  the  evidence  item,
important items uncovered (e.g. deleted files, suspicious running programs) and pertinent
results of those findings. 
V. Timeline
Construct here a basic timeline of events based on the results of the analysis, from system
compromise to acquisition point.  Show how time was obtained (e.g.  system log time, file
metadata).
VI. Appendices
Add here any additional screen shots, hashes, references important to the analysis.
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II.       Forensics Report Example
Forensics Analysis Report
Blue Team: Example Team
Evidence Item: 003
I. Overview
The overview must include the reason for the analysis examination and a summary of the
most important findings of the analysis.
On  01FEB2016  an  image  was  uploaded  to  the  company  webserver  containing
javascript to send session cookies to the email address badGuy001@gmail.com. The file was
uploaded  from  an  internal  ip  address.  Employee  X  was  seen  inserting  a  USB,  against
company policy, to his machine minutes before the image was uploaded. 
II. Items
List  here  all  hardware and software  used  during  the  acquisition  and analysis,  including
version number.
Hardware:
- Lenovo Thinkpad Yoga 14
- Sandisc Cruzer Blade CZ50 16MB
Software:
- Ftk Imager Lite 3.1.1
- Autopsy 2.0
- FileFormat.info/tool/hash.htm
III. Acquisition
The acquisition section must  include all  steps  taken to  preserve the evidence (e.g.  write
blocker)  and  hash  verification  (e.g.  SHA-1,  MD5)  of  the  images.  For  network  analysis
(PCAP) include file download and verification. 
1. Using the software FTK Imager Lite 3.1.1, analyst acquired an image and applied a write
blocker. Selected options to compute the hash prior and after acquisition.
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IV. Findings
The  findings  section  must  include  all  analysis  types  performed  on  the  evidence  item,
important items uncovered (e.g. deleted files, suspicious running programs) and pertinent
results of those findings. 
1. Added the USB Image to Autopsy 2.0 and ran all default analysis modules.
2. Navigated to image folder and selected the “show thumbnails” tab.
Result: no images found
3. Navigated to the deleted files folder
Result: image from the webserver deface.PNG is located
3.  recovered the  image to  the  hard drive  of  the analysis  computer  and used online hash
calculator to compare hash value of the file to that of the uploaded image file:
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V. Timeline
Construct here a basic timeline of events based on the results of the analysis, from system
compromise to acquisition point.  Show how time was obtained (e.g.  system log time, file
metadata).
01FEB2016
- 0830, employee X logs into his computer
- source: system log shows userX sign in
- 0833, employee Y notices employee X plug a USB into his machine
- 0835, file is uploaded to the company home page
- source: network logs show file upload of 900 KB from ip 192.168.10.24
- 0840, employee Y reports employee X's actions to Mr. Joe Shmoe to security desk
- 0845, employee X is asked to produce the USB, which he does
- 0900, acquisition of the USB image is made
VI. Appendices
Add here any additional screenshots, hashes, references important to the case:
- See evidence report 001 for analysis of image uploaded to the company webserver
- See evidence report 002 for network traffic analysis
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III.        Hint Sheets
Your Five Hints-- Instructions
During Day 1 and 2 you may request hint sheets for pcap analysis, memory dump analysis, 
and/or hard disk analysis. These sheets each contain five hints to help you direct your 
analysis efforts. They are not answer sheets. When you request an answer sheet, the total 
number of points you can earn for that category is reduced by 50%. For example, if you 
could earn up to 500 points in the category before requesting the sheet, after the request you 
can only earn up to 250 points. You can request one of these 3 sheets-- pcap, memory, or 
hard disk, through the chat channel. 
Your Five Hints-- PCAP
1. Look for an abnormal TCP port connection
2. Search for connections to the web server address 129.42.65.189 
3. Look at posts made from the victim machine to the web server
4. Look for file downloads to the victim machine 10.1.10.17
5. Look at image EXIF data
Your Five Hints-- Memory Analysis
1. Look at registry autorun executables
2. Look for mutants in suspicious processes
3. String search process dumps 
4. Startup Manager
5. Netscan
Your Five Hints-- Hard Disk Anaysis
1. Search for email attachments
2. Look at prefetch files for file executions
3. Look for hidden folders
4. Look for signs of Spear Phishing
5. Search Windows Event Logs for suspicious connections
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